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CONCISELY SPECIFYING CHOICES
IN AN OUTCOME-SET FORM
Peter A. Streufert
Department of Economics
University of Western Ontario
Abstract. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) specify both
nodes and choices as sets of outcomes. This outcome-set formu-
lation is extended to the infinite horizon by the discrete extensive
forms of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2013).
I propose to restrict such outcome-set forms with a new as-
sumption called “conciseness”. Conciseness requires that choices
be defined in an economical fashion. I find broad classes of infinite-
horizon forms that violate conciseness. Yet, I show that every
outcome-set form can be equivalently re-defined so as to satisfy
conciseness. Thus the assumption of conciseness can increase math-
ematical tractability at no cost to game theorists.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Sections 9 and 10) specify
both nodes and choices as sets of outcomes. In particular, each node is
specified as the set of outcomes that remain conceivable at that point
in the tree. Then each choice is specified as a set of outcomes that can
remain conceivable after the choice is made.
Their formulation is limited to finite horizons. But recently, it has
been insightfully extended to the infinite horizon by the discrete ex-
tensive forms of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2013 henceforth AR). [The
Date: September 6, 2015. Keywords: extensive form, game form. JEL Classi-
fication: C72. Contact information: pstreuf@uwo.ca, 519-661-2111x85384, Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2,
Canada.
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2 1. Introduction
present paper always assumes discreteness. Still more general formula-
tions that do not satisfy discreteness are developed in Alo´s-Ferrer and
Ritzberger (2005, 2008).]
In this paper, I propose to restrict the AR definition with an ad-
ditional assumption known as conciseness. Conciseness requires that
choices are specified in an economical fashion. In particular, it rules
out choices that are not feasible from any node. Further, it prevents a
feasible choice from containing outcomes that are already inconceivable
at the node(s) from which the choice is feasible.
The AR definition implies conciseness in almost all finite-horizon
forms. Thus conciseness is almost redundant in the context of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In contrast, I show by example
that there are broad classes of infinite-horizon forms in which the AR
definition fails to imply conciseness. Thus conciseness is far from re-
dundant in the larger context of AR.
Nonetheless, I argue that conciseness imposes no loss of generality
that would be of concern to game theorists. I do this by showing that
every AR form can be equivalently re-specified in a way that satisfies
conciseness. This is the upshot of Theorems 1 and 2 below.
This paper contributes to a larger agenda. In essence, Streufert
(2015b) finds a triple equivalence between (a) the outcome-set forms
of AR that satisfy this paper’s conciseness, (b) the choice-set forms
of Streufert (2015a), and (c) the choice-sequence forms of Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994). This paper supports that larger agenda: By
justifying the assumption of conciseness, it shrinks the class of AR forms
under consideration, and thereby enables the construction of a one-to-
one correspondence between (a) and (b).
In addition, this paper reformulates the AR form to make it more
directly comparable to (b) and (c). This additional contribution is of
secondary importance.
1.2. Overview
Section 2. This section reformulates the definition of an AR form
in order [1] to conserve notation and [2] to make the concept more
directly comparable to (b) and (c) above. I call my reformulation an
“AR∗ outcome-set form”.
To be somewhat more precise, Theorem 1 nontrivially shows that
the class of AR∗ forms is equal to the class of AR forms except for two
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minor considerations. First, an AR∗ form assumes that every outcome
is contained in its own singleton (terminal) node. AR call this prop-
erty “completeness” and argue that it imposes no loss of generality of
concern to game theorists.
Second, an AR∗ form requires that simultaneous moves be specified
indirectly (by means of multiple information sets). In contrast, an AR
form also allows simultaneous moves to be specified directly (by having
multiple agents move at the same information set). Since the latter
does not extend the scope of strategic situations that can be modelled,
I disallow it so that I can conveniently identify agents with information
sets.
Sections 3 and 4. In order to introduce Sections 3 and 4, I need to
explain the difference between an AR∗ form (discussed above) and an
AR∗ “preform”. A preform specifies both nodes and choices as sets of
outcomes. In contrast, a form is a preform together with an allocation
of choices to players. Thus a preform can be regarded as a one-player
form. Section 3 concerns preforms, while Section 4 concerns forms.
Section 3.1 defines conciseness. In particular, a preform is said to be
“concise” if every outcome in every choice is contained in at least one
node from which the choice is feasible. Conciseness does two things.
First, it rules out choices that are not feasible from any node. Second,
it prohibits a somewhere-feasible choice from containing outcomes that
are outside of (i.e. already inconceivable from) all the nodes at which
the choice is feasible. I call such an outcome an “immaterial” member
of the choice.
Section 3.2 considers preforms with a finite horizon. In this context,
the definition of a preform implies conciseness except for one trivial
consideration.
Section 3.3 considers preforms with an infinite horizon. Here I find
(a) broad classes of preforms with many nowhere-feasible choices, and
(b) broad classes of preforms with many somewhere-feasible choices
that each have many immaterial outcomes. Thus conciseness is a sub-
stantial mathematical restriction.
Section 3.4 nonetheless argues that conciseness imposes no loss of
generality that would be of concern to game theorists. I do so by
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showing that any preform can be equivalently re-defined as a con-
cise preform. The conversion process naturally removes all nowhere-
feasible choices, and also removes all immaterial outcomes from every
somewhere-feasible choice.
Section 4 incorporates the above results about preforms into results
about forms. This is relatively straightforward. Proposition 4.1 shows
that conciseness is essentially redundant in the context of finite-horizon
forms. Then I show that there are broad classes of non-concise infinite-
horizon forms (this follows easily from Section 3.3 because a preform
can be seen as a one-player form). Finally, Theorem 2 shows that any
form can be equivalently re-defined as a concise form.
Concatenating Theorems 1 and 2. Theorems 1 and 2 can be concate-
nated to provide the central result stated casually in the fifth paragraph
of Section 1.1. By Theorem 1, any complete AR form without directly
specified simultaneous moves is an AR∗ form. By Theorem 2, any AR∗
form can be re-defined so as to satisfy conciseness. In this sense, the
class of AR forms can be reformulated and reduced to the class of concise
AR∗ forms. This tractability is the paper’s main contribution.
2. AR∗ forms
Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 together define AR∗ forms. Then Theorem 1
of Section 2.4 shows that an AR∗ form is essentially equivalent to an AR
form.
2.1. Trees specify nodes
Let W be an arbitrary set. Call a member w of the set W an outcome.
An AR∗ outcome-set tree is a pair (W, N˙) such that
N˙ is a collection of subsets of W containing W but not ∅ ,(1a)
(∀n˙1 6=n˙2) n˙1⊃n˙2 or n˙2⊃n˙1 or n˙1∩n˙2=∅ ,(1b)
N˙ ⊇ {{w}|w} ,(1c)
N˙ ⊇ { ∩N˙∗ | N˙∗ is a nonempty chain in N˙ } ,(1d)
and N˙ ⊆ T˙∪{{w}|w} ,(1e)
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where T˙ is defined by1
T˙ := { n˙ | {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙} is finite } ,(2)
and {{w}|w} is the collection of singletons of the form {w}. A member
n˙ of the collection N˙ is called a node.
(1a) requires that nodes are nonempty and that the set W itself is
a node. Thus (1a) implies that W 6= ∅. Accordingly, the smallest AR∗
trees have a singleton W and N˙ = {W}.
For (1b), say that n˙1 precedes n˙2, and that n˙2 succeeds n˙1, whenever
n˙1⊃ n˙2. (1b) states that if two distinct nodes have a nonempty inter-
section, then either the first precedes the second or the second precedes
the first.
(1c) is called completeness (AR page 92). It requires that every single-
ton is a node. Define a terminal node to be a node without a successor.
Since ∅ /∈ N˙ by (1a), (1c) immediately implies that the singleton nodes
coincide with the terminal nodes. Although the collection {{w}|w} of
terminal nodes {w} is in one-to-one correspondence with the set W of
outcomes w, the collection {{w}|w} and the set W are distinct.
For (1d), recall that a chain in N˙ is a collection N˙∗ of nodes n˙ such
that for all distinct n˙1 and n˙2 in N˙∗ either n˙1 ⊃ n˙2 or n˙2 ⊃ n˙1. (1d)
requires that the intersection of every nonempty chain is a node. Since
a node cannot be empty by (1a), this implies that the intersection of
every nonempty chain of nodes is nonempty.
(1e) requires that every node either has a finite number of prede-
cessors or is a terminal node. The converse of (1e) is implied by the
definition of T˙ and (1c). Hence every AR∗ tree satisfies
N˙ = T˙∪{{w}|w} .(3)
For notational ease, let X˙ denote the collection of nonterminal nodes.
In other words, define
X˙ := N˙r{{w}|w} .(4)
By replacing N˙ in (4) with the right-hand side of (3) one obtains
X˙ = T˙r{{w}|w} .(5)
Thus X˙ ⊆ T˙ . Accordingly, I will denote an arbitrary nonterminal node
by t˙∈ X˙.
1I use the superscript [ to suggest a predecessor, and the superscript ] to suggest
a successor.
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The following lemma shows that the class of AR∗ trees equals the
class of complete AR trees. Its proof is nontrivial because the definition
(1) of an AR∗ tree is some distance from AR Definitions 1 and 5.
The completeness appearing in the lemma is an insubstantial qual-
ification because of the discussion on AR page 92. That discussion, in
turn, is based upon the underlying result of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger
(2005, Proposition 10).
Lemma 2.1. (W, N˙) is an AR∗outcome-set tree (1) iff it is a complete
(1c) discrete game tree (AR Definitions 1 and 5 at N=N˙). (Proof B.4.)
In light of (3), it is useful to partition the class of AR∗ trees into the
three subclasses of trees satisfying
T˙ ⊇ {{w}|w} ,(6a)
T˙∩{{w}|w} = ∅ , and(6b)
neither of the above .(6c)
[(6a) and (6b) together would imply {{w}|w}=∅, which contradicts
(1a)’s implication that W 6=∅.] A finite-horizon tree is a tree satisfying
(6a). Here every terminal node has a finite number of predecessors.
An infinite-horizon tree is a tree satisfying (6b) or (6c). Here there is
at least one terminal node that has an infinite number of predecessors.
Given (6b), every terminal node has an infinite number of predeces-
sors. Examples of such games appear in Section 3.3. Given (6c), some
terminal nodes have a finite number of predecessors and others have
an infinite number of predecessors.
Finally, let (W, N˙) be an AR∗ tree (1) with its T˙ (2). Then define its
immediate predecessor function p˙ : T˙r{W}→T˙ by
p˙(t˙) := min{t˙ [|t˙ [⊃t˙} .(7)
Lemma A.1 shows that the function p˙ is well-defined. (The analogous
claim on AR page 80 is immediate.) Further, Lemma A.3 shows (a)
that the function p˙ is onto the set X˙ of nonterminal nodes, and (b)
that every nonterminal node t˙∈X˙ is partitioned by the set p˙−1(t˙) of
its immediate successors. (The first paragraph of Remark B.6 observes
that the analogous proposition in AR contains a minor mistake.)
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2.2. Preforms specify choices
An AR∗ outcome-set preform is a triple (W, N˙, C˙) such that
(W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1) ,(8a)
C˙ is a collection of nonempty subsets of W ,(8b)
(∀t˙∈X˙) p˙−1(t˙) = { t˙∩c˙ | c˙∈F˙ (t˙) } ,(8c)
(∀t˙∈X˙) the members of F˙ (t˙) are disjoint , and(8d)
(∀t˙1, t˙2) F˙ (t˙1)=F˙ (t˙2) or F˙ (t˙1)∩F˙ (t˙2)=∅ ,(8e)
where T˙ , X˙, and p˙ are derived from (W, N˙) by (2), (4), and (7), and
where F˙ is defined by
F˙ := { (t˙, c˙) | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙ ]∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙⊇t˙ ] } .(9)
A member c˙ of the collection C˙ is called a choice. F˙ is called the
feasibility correspondence. Accordingly F˙ (t˙) is called the set of choices
that are feasible from t˙.
(8a) states that a preform incorporates a tree. (8b) says that choices
(like nodes) are nonempty sets of outcomes. (8c) states that the im-
mediate successors of a node are the intersections of the node with
the choices that are feasible from that node. This implies that the
collection X˙ of nonterminal nodes equals the domain F˙−1(C˙) of the
feasibility correspondence F˙ (Lemma A.4). (8d) states that the collec-
tion of feasible choices at any node consists of choices that are disjoint
from one another.
(8e) enables an implicit specification of agents (i.e. information sets).
This implicit specification is analogous to that of AR (page 82), and the
idea itself can be traced back to Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2005, page
791). In particular, let an agent be a member of
H˙ := { F˙−1(c˙) | c˙ } .(10)
Thus each agent F˙−1(c˙) is the collection of nodes from which a choice
c˙ is feasible. By Lemma A.5, (8e) is equivalent to
(∀c˙1, c˙2) F˙−1(c˙1)=F˙−1(c˙2) or F˙−1(c˙1)∩F˙−1(c˙2)=∅ .
Thus (8e) assures that agents are disjoint from one another. Further,
∪H˙ = ∪{ F˙−1(c˙) | c˙ } = F˙−1(C˙) = X˙ ,
where the last equality holds by Lemma A.4. Thus, by the last two
sentences, every nonterminal node is assigned to exactly one agent.
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2.3. Forms specify players
Let I be an arbitrary set, and call i∈ I a player. An AR∗ outcome-set
form is a triple (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) such that
(W, N˙,∪iC˙i) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) ,(11a)
(∀i 6=j) C˙i∩C˙j∩F˙ (X˙) = ∅ , and(11b)
(∀i)(∀t˙∈X˙) F˙ (t˙)⊆C˙i or F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i=∅ .(11c)
where T˙ , X˙, and F˙ are derived from (W, N˙,∪iC˙i) by (2), (4), and (9).
A form uses the individual choice collections C˙i to assign a preform’s
choices to individual players i. Accordingly, a preform can be under-
stood as a single-player form. To be precise, (W, N˙, C˙) is a preform iff
(W, N˙, (C˙)) is a form, provided that (C˙i)i = (C˙) is taken to mean that
I = {1} and C˙1 = C˙.
For (11b), say that a choice c˙ is nowhere-feasible if F˙−1(c˙) = ∅ and
that it is somewhere-feasible if F˙−1(c˙) 6= ∅. By Lemma A.4, F˙ (X˙) is
the set of somewhere-feasible choices. Accordingly, (11b) states that
a somewhere-feasible choice can be in no more than one C˙i. Since
F˙ (X˙) ⊆ ∪iC˙i by the definition of F˙ , this implies that every somewhere-
feasible choice is in exactly one Ci.
For (11c), define
(H˙i)i := ({ F˙−1(c˙) | c˙∈C˙i })i .
Each H˙i is the set of agents (10) assigned to player i. Lemma A.6 uses
(11c) to show that a nonempty agent can be assigned to no more than
one H˙i. Further,
∪iH˙i = ∪i{ F˙−1(c˙) | c˙∈C˙i } = { F˙−1(c˙) | c˙∈C˙ } = H˙ ,
where the last equality holds by (10). Thus, by the last two sentences,
every nonempty agent is in exactly one H˙i.
2
2.4. Equality with AR forms
Theorem 1 will show that the class of AR∗ forms is equal to the class
of AR forms except for two minor considerations. First, AR∗ forms are
assumed to be complete. This restriction is insubstantial, as discussed
in the paragraph before Lemma 2.1.
2All agents are nonempty if every choice is somewhere-feasible. This is one
consequence of conciseness (below).
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Second, an AR∗ form requires that simultaneous moves be specified
indirectly (that is, by means of multiple information sets). In contrast,
an AR form also allows simultaneous moves to be specified directly
(that is, by having multiple agents move at the same information set).
Ritzberger (2002, pages 103-104) carefully discusses these two alterna-
tives in a framework similar to this one. Further, AR Examples 8 and
9 convincingly illustrate some of the advantages of direct specification.
However, since direct specification does not expand the scope of
strategic situations that can be modelled, I have chosen to disallow
it in order to conveniently identify agents with information sets. For-
mally, an AR form is said to be without directly specified simultaneous
moves if
J¨ is singleton-valued ,(12)
where the set-valued function J¨ is defined by AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii)
(symbols with two dots are taken directly from AR, and most such
symbols are confined to Appendix B).
Theorem 1. (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is an AR
∗ outcome-set form (11) iff it
is a complete (1c) discrete extensive form (AR Definition 6 at N=N˙
and (Ci)i=(C˙i)i) without directly specified simultaneous moves (12).
(Proof B.10.)
The proof of Theorem 1 is nontrivial, in part because an AR∗ form
is defined in terms of the feasibility correspondence F˙ (9) while an AR
form is defined in terms of the extended predecessor correspondence
“P ” (AR pages 81–82). Lemma B.7 plays a key role in this conversion.
3. Concise AR∗ preforms
3.1. Definition
Let (W, N˙, C˙) be an AR∗ preform (8) and let F˙ be its feasibility
correspondence (9). Then (W, N˙, C˙) is said to be concise iff
(∀c˙) c˙ ⊆ ∪F˙−1(c˙) .(13)
Thus conciseness means that every choice is covered by the collection
of nodes from which it is feasible.
Conciseness can be understood as a pair of restrictions. To see
the first restriction, recall that every choice c˙ is nonempty by (8b).
Thus conciseness implies that every choice has a nonempty collection
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F˙−1(c˙) of nodes from which it is feasible. In other words, it prohibits
nowhere-feasible choices. Examples of nowhere-feasible choices appear
in Section 3.2 (if W∈ C˙) and in Section 3.3 (in Example 2’s family of
examples).
To see the second restriction, consider a somewhere-feasible choice.
In other words, consider a choice c˙ for which F˙−1(c˙) is nonempty. Then
consider any t˙ ∈ F˙−1(c˙). By definition, c˙ ∈ F˙ (t˙), and thus c˙∩t˙ is an im-
mediate successor of t˙ by (8c). Notice that the outcomes in c˙rt˙ are im-
material to this construction. Accordingly, the outcomes in c˙r∪F˙−1(c˙)
are immaterial to such a construction at any node in F˙−1(c˙). To for-
malize this, let c˙∩∪F˙−1(c˙) be the set of material outcomes in c˙, so
that c˙ r∪F˙−1(c˙) becomes the set of immaterial outcomes in c˙. Concise-
ness implies that somewhere-feasible choices cannot contain immaterial
outcomes. Examples of immaterial outcomes appear in Section 3.3 (in
Example 3’s family of examples).
It will often be useful to have a formal statement of this two-part
characterization of conciseness. First, Lemma A.4 implies that F˙ (X˙) is
the collection of somewhere-feasible choices. Thus the equality F˙ (X˙) =
C˙ is equivalent to the absence of nowhere-feasible choices. Second,
define the material-part function M, from the domain F˙ (X˙), by
M(c˙) = c˙ ∩ ∪F−1(c˙) .(14)
Accordingly, the statement (∀c˙∈F˙ (X˙)) M(c˙) = c˙ is equivalent to the
absence of immaterial outcomes in somewhere-feasible choices. The
following lemma puts these two parts together. Its proof is easy.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose (W, N˙, C˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8)
with its X˙ (4), F˙ (9), and M (14). Then (W, N˙, C˙) is concise (13) iff
C˙ = F˙ (X˙) and (∀c˙) M(c˙) = c˙. (Proof C.1.)
3.2. Almost all finite-horizon preforms are concise
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that (W, N˙, C˙) is a finite-horizon (6a) AR∗
outcome-set preform (8). Then (W, N˙, C˙) is concise (13) iff W /∈ C˙.
(Proof C.3.)
Conciseness implies W /∈ C˙ regardless of the finite-horizon assump-
tion. In other words, any preform (W, N˙, C˙) with W ∈ C˙ is not concise.
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To see this, simply note that in any such preform, W is a nowhere-
feasible choice because
F˙−1(W ) = { t˙ | W 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙ ]∈p˙−1(t˙)) W⊇t˙ ] } = ∅ .(15)
The first equality follows from the definition (9) of F˙ , and the second
follows from the impossibility of W 6⊇t˙.
The converse is more difficult and uses the finite-horizon assumption.
Essentially, deriving conciseness requires showing that every w in every
c˙ belongs to some node from which c˙ is feasible. Consider the chain
consisting of {w} and all its predecessors. It can be shown that the
desired node is the immediate predecessor of the largest member of the
chain that is yet a subset of c˙. Accordingly, if {w} is the only member
of the chain that is a subset of c˙, the desired node is the immediate
predecessor of {w}. The existence of this immediate predecessor is im-
plied by the finite-horizon assumption. However, this argument cannot
be extended to the infinite horizon, since there, a terminal node {w}
might not have an immediate predecessor.
3.3. Examples of non-concise infinite-horizon preforms
This subsection exhibits numerous examples of non-concise infinite-
horizon preforms. Some have many nowhere-feasible choices. Others
have many somewhere-feasible choices that each have many immaterial
outcomes. These examples are important because they demonstrate
that violations of conciseness are liberally allowed by the conditions
(8) that define an AR∗ preform.
Throughout this subsection and all its examples, let W 0 be the Can-
tor set, as defined for instance in Rudin (1976, page 41). The Cantor
set is the set of real numbers in [0, 1] that can be expressed in base 3
without the use of the digit 1.
This paragraph merely defines a convenient way to specify subsets
of W 0. First, let S be the set consisting of (a) the empty sequence
{} and (b) all finite nonempty sequences consisting of 0’s and 2’s. For
notational ease, write a nonempty sequence in S without punctuation.
For example, write (2, 0) as 20. Then define D :S→P(W 0) by (a) let-
ting D({}) = W 0 and (b) for each s∈Sr{{}} letting D(s) be the set of
numbers in W 0 that have a base-3 expansion beginning with (decimal)
12 3. Concise AR∗ preforms
s. For example,
D(20) = [.200¯, .202¯]∩W 0 = [.20, .21]∩W 0
(where all numbers are expressed in base 3). Notice that D is injective.
Hence, D is a bijection from its domain S onto its range {D(s)|s}.
Then let
N˙0 := {D(s)|s} ∪ {{w}|w∈W 0} ,
and call (W 0, N˙0) the Cantor-set tree. Lemma D.1 shows [1] that the
Cantor-set tree is an AR∗ tree, [2] that its T˙ 0 and X˙0 are both equal to
{D(s)|s}, [3] that its p˙0 has domain T˙ 0r{W 0} = {D(s)|s 6={}}, and [4]
that this p˙0 satisfies
(∀s 6={}) p˙0(D(s)) = D(s−)
where s− is the sequence derived from s 6={} by omitting its last com-
ponent. For example, D(20) is an element of T˙ 0r{W 0}, and
p˙0(D(20)) = D(20−) = D(2) .
The rest of this subsection endows the Cantor-set tree (W 0, N˙0) with
various choice collections C˙ in order to create various AR∗ preforms of
the form (W 0, N˙0, C˙). The discussion centers on three relatively simple
examples. Example 1 is concise. Example 2 is non-concise because of
a nowhere-feasible choice. Example 3 is non-concise because of an
immaterial outcome in a somewhere-feasible choice.
Example 1. Suppose the choice collection is {D(s)|s 6={}}. Lemma D.4
shows that the triple
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s 6={}} )
is a concise AR∗ preform. The lemma also shows that this preform’s F˙ 1
(the superscript is for Example 1) is defined by
(∀s) F˙ 1(D(s)) = { D(s⊕0), D(s⊕2) }
where ⊕ is the concatenation operator. For instance,
F˙ 1(D(2)) = { D(20), D(22) } .
Thus the feasible choices at the node D(2) are identical to the node’s
immediate successors. Every other nonterminal node D(s) is similar.
Example 2. Suppose the choice collection is {D(s)|s 6={}}∪ {{1}}. In
other words, take the choice collection {D(s)|s 6={}} of Example 1, and
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introduce the choice {1}. (Recall that 1∈W 0 since 1 = .2¯ .) Lemma D.7
shows that the triple
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s 6={}}∪{{1}} )
is an AR∗ preform. The proof is nontrivial. The lemma also shows that
the preform is not concise because {1} is a nowhere-feasible choice. To
see this, note that the preform’s F˙ 2 (the superscript is for Example 2)
satisfies
(∀c˙) (F˙ 2)−1(c˙) = { t˙ | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙ ]∈(p˙0)−1(t˙)) c˙⊇t˙ ] }
by (9). By the last inclusion, every somewhere-feasible choice c˙ must
contain at least one node t˙ ] with a finite number of predecessors. In
this example, the choice {1} does not subsume a node with a finite
number of predecessors because every such node is an infinite set of
the form D(s). Thus {1} is nowhere-feasible. Thus the preform is not
concise.
This second example is representative of a large class of non-concise
preforms. In particular, let C˙+ be any nonempty collection of nonempty
countable subsets of W 0. The previous paragraph considered the spe-
cial case C˙+ = {{1}}. Alternatively, C˙+ could be the uncountable
collection {{w}|w∈W 0}. Or, C˙+ could be the uncountable collection
consisting of all two-element subsets of W 0. For any such collection
C˙+, Lemma D.6 shows that
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s 6={}}∪C˙+)
is a non-concise AR∗ preform in which all the members of C˙+ are
nowhere-feasible. The lemma’s proof establishes nowhere-feasibility in
a manner similar to the previous paragraph: by assumption, each mem-
ber of C˙+ is countable, and thus, it cannot subsume an uncountably
infinite set of the form D(s).
Example 3. Suppose C˙ is {D(s)|s/∈{{}, 22}}∪ {D(22)∪{.02}}. In
other words, take the choice collection {D(s)|s 6={}} of Example 1, and
replace the choice D(22) with the choice D(22)∪{.02}. Lemma D.3(b)
shows that the triple
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s/∈{{}, 22}}∪ {D(22)∪{.02}} )
is an AR∗ preform. The proof is nontrivial.
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Further, Lemma D.3(a) shows that this preform’s F˙ 3 satisfies
F˙ 3(D(2)) = { D(20), D(22)∪{.02} } ,(16a)
{D(2)} = (F˙ 3)−1(D(20)) , and(16b)
{D(2)} = (F˙ 3)−1(D(22)∪{.02}) .(16c)
In accord with (16a) and (8c), the immediate successors of D(2) are
D(2)∩ D(20) = D(20) and
D(2)∩ (D(22)∪{.02}) = D(22) .
In this fashion, the choice D(20) restricts the set of conceivable outcomes
from D(2) to D(20), and similarly, the choice D(22)∪{.02} restricts the
set of conceivable outcomes from D(2) to D(22). However, .02 is an
immaterial outcome in the choice D(22)∪{.02} because (a) it does not
belong to (i.e. is inconceivable from) D(2) and (b) D(2) is, by (16c), the
only node from which D(22)∪{.02} is feasible. Such immaterial out-
comes are prohibited by conciseness. Hence the preform is not concise.
This example is representative of a large class of non-concise pre-
forms. In particular, let E be any set-valued function from {s|s 6={}}
such that [1] E(0) = E(2) = ∅, and [2] for every s with at least two
components, E(s) is a countable subset of D(	s), where 	s is the se-
quence that is obtained from s by changing its first component. For
example, one could set E(22) = {.02} and E(s) = ∅ everywhere else.
Note that E(22) ⊆ D(02) = D(	22), as the definition of E requires. (This
specification of E leads to Example 3.) A second alternative would be
to set
E(22) = {.02, .022, .0222, .02222, ...}(17)
and E(s) = ∅ everywhere else. Again, E(22) ⊆ D(02) = D(	22). A
third alternative would be to set
E(s) = { .	s, .	s⊕2, .	s⊕22, 	s⊕222, ...}(18)
at every s with at least two components, and to set E(0) = E(2) = ∅
(for instance, the E(22) specified by (18) equals the E(22) specified by
(17)). Again, for every s with at least two components, E(s) ⊆ D(	s),
as the definition of E requires.
Lemma D.2 shows that, for any such function E, (a) the triple
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)∪E(s)|s 6={}} )
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is an AR∗ preform and (b) at every s, E(s) is the set of immaterial
outcomes in the choice D(s)∪E(s). Consequently the preform fails to be
concise if at least one E(s) is nonempty. Proving (a) is a nontrivial task.
In contrast, proving (b) is relatively easy. Consider any nonempty s.
Essentially, E(s) ⊆ D(	s) implies that every element of E(s) is outside
the node p˙0(D(s)) from which D(s)∪E(s) is feasible. Because of this,
every element of E(s) is an immaterial outcome in the choice D(s)∪E(s).
Hence the non-emptiness of any E(s) implies non-conciseness.
3.4. Conciseness is costless to game theorists
The previous subsection showed by example that conciseness is a con-
siderable mathematical restriction. In contrast, the following lemma
shows that conciseness imposes no loss of generality that would con-
cern game theorists. It does so by showing that every preform can
be naturally and equivalently re-defined as a concise preform. This is
explained in detail after the lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Let (W, N˙, C˙) be an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) with
its T˙ (2), X˙ (4), and F˙ (9). To re-define this preform, let C˙M :=
M(F˙ (X˙)), where M is defined by (14). Then the following hold.
(a) (W, N˙, C˙M) is a concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform.
(b) M is a bijection from F˙ (X˙) onto C˙M, and
(c) { (t˙, M(c˙)) | (t˙, c˙)∈F˙ } equals the F˙ M (9) from (W, N˙, C˙M).
(Proof C.7.)
First consider the definition of the new choice collection C˙M in the
lemma’s second sentence. This definition could be restated as
C˙M = { M(c˙) | c˙∈F˙ (X˙) } .
This definition takes C˙ to C˙M into two steps. First, the original choices
in N˙rF˙ (X˙) are excluded. In other words, all nowhere-feasible choices
are removed. Second, every original choice c˙∈F˙ (X˙) is converted to M(c˙).
In other words, every somewhere-feasible choice loses all its immaterial
outcomes.
The examples of Section 3.3 illustrate this two-step definition. In Ex-
ample 2’s family, the first step removes all the nowhere-feasible choices
in C˙+, and the second step is vacuous. In this fashion, each preform
in Example 2’s family is converted to Example 1. (Full details are in
Lemma D.6 and Example 1’s definition.) Meanwhile, in Example 3’s
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family, the first step is vacuous, and the second step removes all the im-
material outcomes from every somewhere-feasible choice. In particular,
each choice D(s)∪E(s) becomes M(D(s)∪E(s)) = D(s). In this fashion,
each preform in Example 3’s family is converted to Example 1. (Full
details are in Lemma D.2 and Example 1’s definition.)
Part (a) of Lemma 3.3 shows that this two-step procedure will con-
vert any preform into a concise preform. In other words, it shows [1]
that a preform remains a preform after its nowhere-feasible choices and
immaterial outcomes have been removed, and [2] that the resulting pre-
form is concise. For instance, all of the above examples are converted
to Example 1 (by the previous paragraph), and Example 1 is a concise
preform (by Lemma D.4).
Parts (b) and (c) of Lemma 3.3 describe the sense in which the orig-
inal preform and the new preform are “equivalent”. In particular, part
(b) shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the col-
lection F˙ (X˙) ⊆ C˙ of original somewhere-feasible choices and the col-
lection C˙M of new choices. Then part (c) relates the original feasibility
correspondence F˙ to the new feasibility correspondence F˙ M. Although
all the parts of the lemma are natural, they are not easily proved.
4. Concise AR∗ forms
Let a concise AR∗ outcome-set form be an AR∗ outcome-set form (11)
whose preform (11a) is concise (13). In other words, a concise AR∗
outcome-set form is a triple (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) such that
(W, N˙,∪iC˙i) is a concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) ,(19a)
(∀i 6=j) C˙i∩C˙j∩F˙ (X˙) = ∅ , and(19b)
(∀i)(∀t˙∈X˙) F˙ (t˙)⊆C˙i or F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i=∅ ,(19c)
where T˙ , X˙, and F˙ are derived from (2), (4), and (9).
The following proposition shows that conciseness is essentially vac-
uous for finite-horizon forms. This proposition follows easily from
Lemma 3.2, which concerned preforms rather than forms.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is an AR
∗ outcome-set
form (8) with a finite horizon (6a). Then (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is a concise AR
∗
outcome-set form (19) iff W /∈ ∪iC˙i. (Proof C.8.)
Recall the many non-concise infinite-horizon preforms of Section 3.3.
Since a preform is a one-player form, these preforms also show that
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there are many non-concise infinite-horizon forms. These examples are
important because they demonstrate that violations of conciseness are
liberally allowed by the conditions (11) that define an AR∗ form. Hence,
by Theorem 1, such violations of conciseness are liberally allowed by
the definition of an AR form.
Nevertheless, the following theorem shows that conciseness imposes
no loss of generality that would concern game theorists. It does so by
showing that every form can be naturally and equivalently re-defined
as a concise form. The theorem itself is an extension of Lemma 3.3,
which concerned preforms rather than forms. Most of the work was
done there, and the discussion following that lemma can be readily
adapted to interpret the theorem here.
Theorem 2. Let (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) be an AR
∗ outcome-set form (11), with
its T˙ (2), X˙ (4), and F˙ (9). To re-define this form, let
( C˙Mi )i := ( M(C˙i∩F˙ (X˙)) )i ,
where M is defined by (14). Then the following hold.
(a) (W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i) is a concise AR
∗ outcome-set form (19).
(b) M is a bijection from F˙ (X˙) onto ∪iC˙Mi .
(c) { (t˙, M(c˙)) | (t˙, c˙)∈F˙ } equals the F˙ M (9) from (W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i).
(Proof C.9.)
Finally, I include a useful but very minor result. The following char-
acterization of a concise form is slightly simpler than its definition (19).
Specifically, (19b) can be simplified to (20b) in the presence of concise-
ness.
Proposition 4.2. (W,N, (C˙i)i) is a concise AR
∗ outcome-set form
(19) iff
(W, N˙,∪iC˙i) is a concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) ,(20a)
(∀i6=j) C˙i∩C˙j = ∅ , and(20b)
(∀i)(∀t˙∈X˙) F˙ (t˙)⊆C˙i or F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i=∅ ,(20c)
where T˙ , X˙, and F˙ are derived from (2), (4), and (9). (Proof C.10.)
Appendix A. Basic Lemmata
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This appendix provides some basic lemmata for the AR∗ framework.
Most of these lemmata are discussed briefly in Section 2, and the re-
mainder are used in proving the ones that are discussed there. None
of the lemmata rely on AR, and none of them refer to conciseness.
A.1. For AR∗ trees
Lemma A.1. If (W, N˙) satisfies (1a) and (1b) in the definition of
an AR∗ outcome-set tree, then p˙ (7) is well-defined.
Proof. Define T˙ (2), and take any t˙∈ T˙r{W}.
This paragraph makes three observations about {t˙[|t˙[⊃t˙}. First,
{t˙[|t˙[⊃t˙} is finite by t˙∈ T˙ and the definition of T˙ . Second, {t˙[|t˙[⊃t˙} is
nonempty because t˙ 6=W by assumption and thus W is an element of
the set by (1a). Third, {t˙[|t˙[⊃t˙} is a chain. To see this, (a) take any
two distinct t˙1 and t˙2 in {t˙[|t˙[⊃t˙}, (b) note that t˙1∩t˙2 6=∅ since both
sets subsume t˙, and (c) conclude that one of t˙1 and t˙2 precedes the
other by (1b).
By the previous paragraph, {t˙[|t˙[⊃t˙} is a finite nonempty chain.
Hence its minimum exists and is an element of T˙ . 2
Lemma A.2. Suppose (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1) with
its T˙ (2), X˙ (4), and p˙ (7). Then if t˙∈X˙ is such that t˙3w, there exists
t˙]∈p˙−1(t˙) such that t˙]3w.
Proof. Suppose t˙∈X˙ is such that t˙3w. Since t˙3w, we have t˙⊇{w}.
Thus, by t˙∈X˙ and the definition of X˙, we have t˙⊃{w}.
On the one hand, suppose there is not an n˙+ such that t˙⊃n˙+⊃{w}.
The last two sentences imply {w}∈ T˙r{W}, which is the domain of p˙.
The last three sentences imply t˙ = p˙({w}). Thus we may let t˙] be {w}.
On the other hand, suppose there is a n˙+ such that t˙⊃n˙+⊃{w}. Let
N˙+ := { n˙ | t˙⊃n˙⊇n˙+ } .
The remainder of this paragraph makes three observations about N˙+.
First, N˙+ is nonempty because it contains n˙+. Second, N˙+ is a chain.
To see this, [a] take two distinct elements n˙1 and n˙2 of N˙+, [b] note
that their intersection contains w since w∈n˙+, and [c] conclude that
either n˙1⊃n˙2 or n˙2⊃n˙1 holds by (1b). Third, N˙+ is finite. To see this,
note [a] that n˙+ ∈ X˙ by virtue of its being a predecessor of {w}, [b]
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that this implies n˙+ ∈ T˙ by (5), and [c] that this implies n+ has a finite
number of predecessors by the definition of T˙ .
By the previous paragraph, N˙+ is a nonempty finite chain. Hence it
contains its own union ∪N˙+. Hence by the definitions of N˙+ and n˙+,
t˙ ⊃ ∪N˙+ ,(21a)
(/∃n˙) t˙⊃ n˙⊃∪N˙+ , and(21b)
∪N+⊇n+⊃{w} .(21c)
(21a,b) imply ∪N˙+ ∈ T˙r{W}, which is the domain of p˙. (21a,b) and
the last sentence imply t˙ = p˙(∪N˙+). This and (21c) allow us to let t˙]
be ∪N˙+. 2
Lemma A.3. Suppose (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1) with
its T˙ (2), X˙ (4), and p˙ (7). Then the following hold.
(a) p˙ is onto X˙.
(b) (∀t˙∈X˙) p˙−1(t˙) is a partition of t˙ that has at least two elements.
Proof. (a). To see that p˙ is into X˙, take any t˙∈ T˙r{W}. By
Lemma A.1, p˙(t˙) exists. Further, p˙(t˙) ⊃ t˙ by the definition of p˙. Thus
p˙(t˙) ∈ X˙ by the definition of X˙.
To see that p˙ is onto X˙, take any t˙∈ X˙. Since t˙ is a node, there
exists w∈ t˙. Thus Lemma A.2 implies the existence of a t˙] ∈ p˙−1(t˙).
(b). Take any t˙∈X˙. On the one hand, the definition of p˙ implies
that every t˙]∈p˙−1(t˙) satisfies t˙ ⊃ t˙]. Hence t˙ ⊇ ∪p˙−1(t˙). On the other
hand, Lemma A.2 implies that for every w∈t˙ there exists a t˙] ∈ p˙−1(t˙)
such that w∈t˙]. Hence t˙ ⊆ ∪p˙−1(t˙). By putting these two together we
obtain
t˙ = ∪p˙−1(t˙).(22)
This paragraph shows that t˙ is partitioned by p˙−1(t˙). Given (22), it
remains to show that the elements of p˙−1(t˙) are nonempty and disjoint.
Each element of p˙−1(t˙) in nonempty simply because each is a node and
nodes are nonempty by (1a). To show disjointness, suppose that t˙1
and t˙2 were two distinct elements of p˙−1(t˙) that are not disjoint. (1b)
would then imply that either t˙1⊃t˙2 or t˙1⊃t˙2. Without loss of generality
assume t˙1⊃t˙2. Then t˙⊃t˙1⊃t˙2, where the first inclusion follows from
t˙1∈p˙−1(t˙) and the second follows from the previous sentence. This
contradicts t˙2∈p˙−1(t˙).
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Finally, this paragraph shows that p˙−1(t˙) contains at least two ele-
ments. Since t˙ is nonempty simply because it is a node, (22) implies
the existence of some t˙1 ∈ p˙−1(t˙). By the definition of p˙, t˙⊃t˙1, and
thus, we may take w ∈ t˙rt˙1. By (22) again, there exists t˙2 ∈ p˙−1(t˙)
such that w∈t˙2. Thus since w/∈t˙1 by the definition of t˙1, t˙1 and t˙2 are
distinct. 2
A.2. For AR∗ preforms
Lemma A.4. Suppose (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1) with
its X˙ (4). Let C˙ be any set, and derive F˙ by (9). Then the following
hold.
(a) F˙−1(C˙) ⊆ X˙.
(b) F˙−1(C˙) = X˙ if (W, N˙, C˙) satisfies (8c) in the definition of an
AR∗ outcome-set preform.
Proof. Also derive T˙ (2) and p˙ (7).
(a). Take any t˙ in the domain F˙−1(C˙) of F˙ . Then there exists a c˙
such that (t˙, c˙) ∈ F˙ . Hence the definition of F˙ implies the existence
of an t˙ ] ∈ p˙−1(t˙). Hence the definition of p˙ implies t˙ ] ⊂ t˙. Hence the
definition of X˙ implies t˙ ∈ X˙.
(b). I need only show the converse of part (a). Accordingly, take any
t˙ ∈ X˙. Then by Lemma A.3(a), p˙−1(t˙) is nonempty. Hence by (8c),
F˙ (t˙) is nonempty. Hence t˙ is in the domain F˙−1(C) of F˙ . 2
Lemma A.5. If F˙ ⊆ T˙×C˙, the following are equivalent.
(a) (∀c˙, c˙′) F˙−1(c˙)=F˙−1(c˙′) or F˙−1(c˙)∩F˙−1(c˙′)=∅.
(b) (∀t˙, t˙′) F˙ (t˙)=F˙ (t˙′) or F˙ (t˙)∩F˙ (t˙′)=∅.
Proof. Every t, c, and F in this proof should have a dot over it.
I have removed the dots to make reading easier. By inspection, the
following seven statements are equivalent.
(∃c, c′) F−1(c) 6= F−1(c′) and F−1(c)∩F−1(c′) 6= ∅.(23a)
(∃c1, c2) F−1(c2)rF−1(c1) 6= ∅ and F−1(c2)∩F−1(c1) 6= ∅.
(∃c1, c2, t1, t2) t1∈F−1(c2), t1 /∈F−1(c1), t2∈F−1(c2), and t2∈F−1(c1).
(∃c1, c2, t1, t2) (t1, c1)/∈F and {(t1, c2), (t2, c1), (t2, c2)}⊆F.
(∃c1, c2, t1, t2) c1∈F (t2), c1 /∈F (t1), c2∈F (t2), and c2∈F (t1).
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(∃t1, t2) F (t2)rF (t1) 6= ∅ and F (t2)∩F (t1) 6= ∅.
(∃t, t′) F (t) 6= F (t′) and F (t)∩F (t′) 6= ∅.(23b)
(23a) is the negation of (a), and (23b) is the negation of (b). 2
A.3. For AR∗ forms
Lemma A.6. Suppose that (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is an AR
∗ outcome-set form
(11) with its F˙ (9). Then the members of ({ F˙−1(c˙)6=∅ | c˙∈C˙i })i are
disjoint.
Proof. Suppose there exists i1 6= i2, c˙1 ∈ C˙i1 , and c˙2 ∈ C˙i2 such that
F˙−1(c˙1)∩F˙−1(c˙2) 6= ∅. Take t˙ ∈ F˙−1(c˙1)∩F˙−1(c˙2). I now gather four
facts about F˙ (t˙). [1] Since c˙1 ∈ F˙ (t˙), F˙ (t˙) 6= ∅. [2] Since t˙ ∈ F˙−1(c˙1),
t˙ ∈ F˙−1(C). Hence t˙ ∈ X˙ by Lemma A.4(a). Hence F˙ (t˙) ⊆ F˙ (X˙).
[3] Since c˙1 ∈ F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i1 , (11c) implies that F˙ (t˙) ⊆ C˙i1 . [4] Similarly,
since c˙2 ∈ F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i2 , (11c) implies that F˙ (t˙) ⊆ C˙i2 . These four facts
imply that F˙ (t˙) is a nonempty subset of F˙ (X˙)∩C˙i1∩C˙i2 . This contra-
dicts (11b). 2
Appendix B. Connection with AR
This appendix proves Theorem 1 (Section 2.4), which shows that AR∗
forms are essentially identical to AR forms. En route, Lemma 2.1 relates
AR∗ trees to AR trees. Symbols with double dots are taken directly from
AR. Virtually all such symbols are confined to this appendix. The only
exception is the J¨ appearing in Section 2.4.
B.1. For Lemma 2.1
Lemma B.1. Suppose that (W, N˙) satisfies (1a) and (1c), and de-
rive its T˙ (2) and X˙ (4). Set the AR N to N˙ . Then
(a) X˙ = X¨, where X¨ is defined by AR page 80.
Further, suppose (W, N˙) also satisfies (1e). Then
(b) T˙ = F¨ (N˙), where F¨ (N˙) is defined by AR page 80.
Proof. (a). Suppose n˙∈ X˙. By the definition of X˙, n˙ cannot be a
singleton. Also note [1] n˙ 6=∅ by (1a), so [2] there is some wˆ∈ n˙, and
so [3] n˙⊇{wˆ}∈ N˙ by (1c). By the last two sentences, n˙⊃{wˆ}∈ N˙ and
thus n˙∈ X¨ by the definition of X¨.
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Conversely, take any n˙∈ X¨. Then by the definition of X¨, there
exists n˙] such that n˙⊃ n˙]. Since n˙] cannot be empty by (1a), n˙ is not
a singleton. Hence n˙∈ X˙ by the definition of X˙.
(b). Suppose n˙∈ T˙ . Then by the definition of T˙ , either n˙ has no
predecessors or n˙ has a finite positive number of predecessors. In the
first case, n˙ = W by (1a). Thus n˙ ∈ F¨ (N˙) by the definition of F¨ (N˙).
In the second case, {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙} has a minimum, which implies that n˙ is
“finite” in the sense of AR page 80. This implies that n˙∈ F¨ (N˙) by the
definition of F¨ (N˙).
Conversely, take any n˙∈ F¨ (N˙). Then by the definition of F¨ (N˙),
either n˙ = W or n˙ is “finite” in the sense of AR page 80. In the first
case, n˙∈ T˙ by the definition of T˙ . In the second case, the definition
of “finiteness” allows us to let n˙∗ be the minimum of {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙}. Note
[1] n˙∗⊃ n˙, so [2] n˙∗ /∈{{w}|w} since n˙ is nonempty by (1a), and so [3]
n˙∗ ∈ T˙ by (1e). Therefore, the definitions of n˙∗ and T˙ imply that n˙∈ T˙ .
2
Lemma B.2. Suppose that (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1)
with its T˙ (2) and X˙ (4). Then the following hold (set the AR N to N˙).
(a) X˙ = X¨, where X¨ is defined on AR page 80.
(b) T˙ = F¨ (N˙), where F¨ (N˙) is defined on AR page 80.
(c) (W, N˙) is a complete (1c) discrete game tree (AR Definitions 1
and 5).
Proof. (a,b). These two parts follow from Lemma B.1.
(c). First I show that (W, N˙) is a game tree (AR Definition 1). I do
this in four steps. [1] The first three lines of AR Definition 1 are implied
by (1a). [2] AR Definition 1 (GT.i) in the forward direction is implied
by (1d) together with the fact that ∅ /∈ N˙ by (1a). [3] To derive AR
Definition 1 (GT.i) in the reverse direction, consider any N˙∗ ⊆ N˙ and
for which there exists w∈∩N˙∗ (set their h to N˙∗). Take any distinct
n˙1 and n˙2 in N˙∗. By the existence of w, n˙1∩n˙2 6=∅. Hence n˙1⊃ n˙2
or n˙2⊃ n˙1 by (1b). Thus N˙∗ is a chain. [4] To derive AR Definition 1
(GT.ii), take any w and w′ and let x = {w} and x′ = {w′}. These are
members of N˙ by (1c).
Next I show that (W, N˙) is discrete (AR Definition 5). I do this in
three steps. [1] No node is “strange” in the sense of AR Definition 2.
To see this, take any n˙ ∈ N˙r{W} (set their x to n˙ and their N to
N˙). Then their (↑ x)r{x} becomes {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙}. I must show that this
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collection has an infimum in N˙ . By AR Definition 1 (GT.i) in the reverse
direction (which was derived in the previous paragraph), {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙} is a
chain. Hence by (1d), ∩{n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙} is a node. This node is the infimum
of {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙}. [2] (W, N˙) is regular in the sense of AR Definition 4. This
follows immediately from [1]. [3] (W, N˙) is discrete. To show this, I
apply AR Theorem 1. By the previous paragraph and [2], (W, N˙) is
a regular game tree. Further, condition (d) of AR Theorem 1 holds
because of part (a) and because X˙ ⊆ T˙ by (5). Hence AR Theorem
1(d⇒a) implies that (W, N˙) is discrete.
Finally, completeness (1c) is directly assumed as part of the definition
of an AR∗ outcome-set tree. 2
Lemma B.3. Suppose (W, N˙) is a complete (1c) discrete game tree
(AR Definitions 1 and 5 at N=N˙). Derive its X¨ and F¨ (N˙) by AR page
80. Then the following hold.
(a) X¨ = X˙, where X˙ is defined by (4).
(b) F¨ (N˙) = T˙ , where T˙ is defined by (2).
(c) (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1).
Proof. First, I show (i) that (W, N˙) satisfies (1a) and (1c), and (ii)
that part (a) holds. (1a) follows from the first three lines of AR Defi-
nition 1. (1c) has been assumed directly. Thus Lemma B.1(a) implies
part (a).
Second, I show two intermediate results: (i) that (W, N˙) is regular
in the sense of AR Definition 4, and (ii) that X¨ ⊆ T˙ . By AR Definition 5
and AR Proposition 3 in the forward direction, the assumed discreteness
of (W, N˙) implies that (W, N˙) is regular. Because of regularity and
discreteness, AR Theorem 1 (a⇒d) implies that (∀n˙∈X¨) {n˙[|n˙[⊃n˙} is
finite. By the definition of T˙ , this is equivalent to X¨ ⊆ T˙ .
Third, I show (i) that (W, N˙) satisfies (1e), and (ii) that part (b)
holds. By part (a) and by the second conclusion of the previous para-
graph, X˙ ⊆ T˙ . Hence
N˙ = (N˙r{{w}|w})∪{{w}|w} = X˙∪{{w}|w} ⊆ T˙∪{{w}|w} ,
where the second equation holds by the definition of X˙ and the set
inclusion holds by the previous sentence. This result is (1e). Finally,
(1e), the first conclusion of the first paragraph, and Lemma B.1(b)
together imply part (b).
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Finally, consider part (c). (1a), (1c), and (1e) have already been
established by the first and third paragraphs. To derive (1b), suppose
that n˙1 and n˙2 are distinct and have a nonempty intersection. Since n˙1
and n˙2 have a nonempty intersection, the reverse direction of AR Defi-
nition 1 (GT.i) implies that {n˙1, n˙2} is a chain. Thus the distinctness
of n˙1 and n˙2 implies that either n˙1⊃n˙2 or n˙2⊃n˙1.
It remains to derive (1d). Accordingly, take any nonempty chain
N˙∗ ⊆ N˙ . Suppose N˙∗ is a finite chain. Then ∩N˙∗ is the smallest node
in N˙∗. This implies ∩N˙∗ ∈ N˙ by the assumption that N˙∗ ⊆ N˙ . Hence
we may suppose henceforth that
N˙∗ is an infinite chain .(24)
By AR Definition 1 (GT.i) in the forward direction, there exists some
w1 such that ∩N˙∗ 3w1. Suppose that ∩N˙∗ = {w1}. Then ∩N˙∗ ∈ N˙
by completeness. Hence we may suppose henceforth that
∩N˙∗ ⊃ {w1} .(25)
The remainder of this proof shows that this leads to a contradiction.
By the regularity derived in the first conclusion of the second para-
graph,
n˙1 := inf{n˙|n˙⊃{w1}}
is a well-defined node. Note that
∩N˙∗ ⊇ ∩{n˙|n˙⊇{w1}} ⊇ inf{n˙|n˙⊇{w1}} = n˙1 ,(26)
where the first set inclusion follows from (25) and the equality is the
definition of n˙1. (∩N˙∗ and ∩{n˙|n˙⊇{w1}} may or may not be nodes.)
Since {w1} is a node by completeness, the definition of n˙1 implies
that n˙1 ⊇ {w1}. Suppose n˙1 ⊃ {w1}. Then n˙1 ∈ X¨ by the definition
of X¨. Yet n˙1 /∈ T˙ by (24), (26), and the definition of T˙ . The last
two sentences contradict X¨ ⊆ T˙ , which is the second conclusion of the
second paragraph. Hence we may suppose henceforth that
n˙1 = {w1} .(27)
By (25), there exists w2 such that
w2 6= w1 and(28a)
∩N˙∗ 3 w2 .(28b)
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Further, (28a), (27), and the definition of n˙1 imply the existence of a
n˙+ such that
n˙+ ⊃ {w1} and(29a)
n˙+ 63 w2 .(29b)
Now consider any n˙∗ in the chain N˙∗. By (25) and (29a), we have
w1 ∈ n˙∗∩n˙+. By (28b) and (29b), we have w2 ∈ n˙∗rn˙+. The last
two sentences and (1b) (which has already been derived) imply that
n˙∗ ⊃ n˙+. Since this holds for all n˙∗ ∈ N˙∗, we have ∩N˙∗ ⊇ n˙+.
By (24), the last sentence, and the definition of T˙ , we have that
n˙+ /∈ T˙ . Yet by (29a), we have that n˙+ ∈ X¨. The last two sentences
contradict X¨ ⊆ T˙ , which is the second conclusion of the second para-
graph. 2
Proof B.4 (for Lemma 2.1). Lemma 2.1 follows immediately from
Lemma B.2(c) and Lemma B.3(c). 2
B.2. Further observations about trees
The remark and two lemmata in this section are concerned only with
trees. They will be used to support Section B.3’s proofs about forms.
Lemma B.5. Suppose that (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1).
Derive p˙ (7), F¨ (N˙) (AR page 80 at N=N˙), and p¨ (AR page 80). Then
(a) p˙ = p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W} and
(b) p˙∪{(W,W )} = p¨.
Proof. Define T˙ by (2). By Lemma B.2(b), T˙ = F¨ (N˙).
(a). Since T˙ = F¨ (N˙), the definition of p˙ and the definition of
p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W} in AR page 80 equation (2) together imply that p˙ = p¨|T˙r{W}.
(b). Since T˙ = F¨ (N˙), AR page 80 defines the domain of p¨ to be all
of F¨ (N˙) and sets p¨(W ) = W . Thus p˙∪{(W,W )} = p¨. 2
Remark B.6. AR Proposition 1(a) appears to have a minor mistake.
To be precise, suppose (W, N˙) is a complete (1c) discrete game tree (AR
Definitions 1 and 5 at N=N˙), and derive its F¨ (N˙) and p¨ by AR page 80.
The proposition claims that every nonterminal node x is partitioned
by p¨−1(x). However, the initial node W is not partitioned by p¨−1(W )
(given W is nonterminal). Rather, (i) W is nontrivially partitioned by
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(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(W ) and (ii) p¨−1(W ) is the union of this partition and
{W}. The latter is not a partition because its elements are not disjoint.
This paragraph proves claims (i) and (ii). To prove (i), note that
(W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree by Lemma 2.1, and derive its p˙ by (7).
Lemma A.3(b) implies that p˙−1(W ) is a partition of W with at least
two elements. Hence Lemma B.5(a) implies that (p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(W ) is
a partition of W with at least two elements. To prove (ii), note that
W ∈ F¨ (N˙) and that F¨ (N˙) is the domain of p¨. Hence (ii) is equivalent
to p¨(W ) = W . This equality is part of the definition of p¨ on AR page
80.
In accord with its Proposition 1(a), AR interprets p¨−1(x) as the collec-
tion of immediate successors of a nonterminal node x (see for example
the discussion of (DEF.ii) after Definition 6). In light of the above, I
replace p¨−1(x) with (p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x) as the need arises. This expres-
sion appears on several occasions, including Lemma B.7, equation (43),
and equation (49). In effect, I prohibit W from ever being regarded as
a successor.
Lemma B.7. Suppose that (W, N˙) is a complete (1c) discrete game
tree (AR Definitions 1 and 5 at N=N˙). Next define its X¨, F¨ (N˙), p¨,
and P¨ by AR pages 80 and 82. Then
P¨ = { (a, x)∈P(W )×X¨ | a 6⊇x and (∃n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x)) a⊇n˙ } .
Proof. The lemma’s conclusion is equivalent to
(∀a∈P(W ))(30)
P¨ (a) = { x∈X¨ | a 6⊇x and (∃n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x)) a⊇n˙ } .
This will be proven by considering two cases.
First consider a = W . Here I will argue that the empty set is on
both sides of the equality in (30). The right-hand side is
{ x∈X¨ | W 6⊇x and (∃n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x)) W⊇n˙ } .
No x can belong to this set because W is a superset of every node x.
Meanwhile, the left-hand side P¨ (W ) equals
{ x∈N˙ | (∃y⊆W ) {n˙|n˙⊇x}={n˙|n˙⊇y}r{n˙|n˙⊆W} }
by the definition of P¨ on AR page 82. No x can satisfy the equality
defining this set because (a) {n˙|n˙⊇x} is nonempty for every x (since
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W belongs to it) and yet (b) {n˙|n˙⊇y}r{n˙|n˙⊆W} is empty (since every
node n˙ belongs to {n˙|n˙⊆W}).
Second consider any a ∈ P(W )r{W}. Consider AR Proposition 2.
The discreteness (AR Definition 5) of (W, N˙) implies up-discreteness.
Further, completeness (1c) implies that a is an element of the “A(T )”
defined at the start of AR Proposition 2. Thus AR Proposition 2(b)
implies that
P¨ (a) = { p¨(n˙) | n˙∈N¨(a)∩F¨ (N˙) } ,(31)
where AR equation (6) defines
N¨(a) := { n˙ | a⊇n˙ and (/∃n˙[) a⊇n˙[⊃n˙ } .(32)
This paragraph argues that
N¨(a)∩F¨ (N˙)(33)
= { n˙∈F¨ (N˙) | a⊇n˙ and (/∃n˙[) a⊇n˙[⊃n˙ }
= { n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W} | a⊇n˙ and (/∃n˙[) a⊇n˙[⊃n˙ }
= { n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W} | a⊇n˙ and a 6⊇ p¨(n˙) } .
The first equality holds by (32). To prove the second equality, it must
be argued that the left-hand set is included within the right-hand set.
Accordingly, consider any n˙∈F¨ (N˙) that satisfies a⊇n˙. Because a 6=W
by assumption, a⊇n˙ implies n˙ 6=W . Thus n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W}. Finally,
the third equality follows from the definition of p¨ over F¨ (N˙)r{W},
as stated in AR page 80 equation (2).
The remainder of the proof establishes the equality in (30) by arguing
that
P¨ (a)
= { p¨(n˙) | n˙∈N¨(a)∩F¨ (N˙) }
= { p¨(n˙) | n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W}, a⊇n˙, a 6⊇ p¨(n˙) }
= { p¨(n˙) | a 6⊇ p¨(n˙), a⊇n˙, n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W} }
= { x∈X¨ | a 6⊇x and (∃n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x)) a⊇n˙ } .
The first equality holds by (31), the second equality holds by (33), the
third equality is a rearrangement, and the final equality is proved by
the next two paragraphs.
On the one hand, take any p¨(n˙) in the set on the final equation’s left-
hand side. Let x = p¨(n˙). This x is in the right-hand set because [1]
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x∈X¨ by the definition of p¨, [2] a 6⊇x by the left-hand fact that a 6⊇ p¨(n˙)
and the definition of x, [3] n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x) by the definition of x
and the left-hand fact that n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W}, and [4] a⊇n˙ because this is
itself a left-hand fact.
On the other hand, take any x in the right-hand set. Then
a 6⊇ x ,(34)
and there exists n˙ in (p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x) such that
a ⊇ n˙ .(35)
Further, since n˙ is in (p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x), we have both
n˙ ∈ F¨ (N˙)r{W} and(36a)
x = p¨(n˙) .(36b)
Note that p¨(n˙) is in the left-hand set because [1] a 6⊇p¨(n˙) by (34) and
(36b), [2] a⊇n˙ by (35), and [3] n˙∈F¨ (N˙)r{W} by (36a). Thus x is in
the left-hand set by (36b). 2
B.3. For Theorem 1
Lemma B.8. Suppose (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is an AR
∗ outcome-set form
(11). Then the following hold.
(a) (W, N˙) is a complete (1c) discrete game tree (AR Definitions 1
and 5 at N=N˙).
(b) (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is a complete discrete extensive form (AR Defini-
tion 6 at N=N˙ and (Ci)i=(C˙i)i) without directly specified simultaneous
moves (12).
Proof. (a). Let C˙=∪iC˙i. By (11a) in the definition of an AR∗ form,
(W, N˙, C˙) is an AR∗ preform (8). Thus by (8a) in the definition of an
AR∗ preform, (W, N˙) is an AR∗ tree (1). Thus by Lemma 2.1, (W, N˙) is
a complete discrete game tree.
(b). Since completeness was shown in part (a), it remains to be
shown that (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is a discrete extensive form (AR Definition
6) without directly specified simultaneous moves. The next eight para-
graphs establish AR Definition 6. The last paragraph shows the absence
of directly specified simultaneous moves.
Appendix B 29
This paragraph shows the opening four lines of AR Definition 6.
(W, N˙) is a discrete game tree by part (a). Further, every C˙i consists
of nonempty unions of nodes by (8b) and (1c).
This paragraph collects the four identities listed in (37). Define T˙ ,
X˙, p˙, and F˙ by (2), (4), (7), and (9). Further, by part (a), we may
define X¨, F¨ (N˙), p¨, and P¨ by AR pages 80 and 82.3 By Lemmata B.2(a),
B.2(b), and B.5(a),
X¨ = X˙ ,(37a)
F¨ (N˙) = T˙ , and(37b)
p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W} = p˙ ,(37c)
Further, the remainder of this paragraph argues that
P¨ |C˙(37d)
= { (c˙, x)∈C˙×X¨ | c˙6⊇x and (∃n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x)) c˙⊇n˙ }
= { (c˙, x)∈C˙×X˙ | c˙ 6⊇x and (∃n˙∈p˙−1(x)) c˙⊇n˙ }
= { (c˙, t˙)∈C˙×X˙ | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃n˙∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙⊇n˙ }
= F˙−1 .
The first equality holds by Lemma B.7, part (a), and the fact that
C˙ ⊆ P(W ) by (8b). The second equality holds by (37a) and (37c). The
third equality holds because X˙ ⊆ T˙ by (5) (the symbol t˙ is reserved
for members of T˙ ). The final equality holds by the definition (9) of F˙
and Lemma A.4(a).
This paragraph shows AR Definition 6 (DEF.i). Accordingly, take any
c˙ and c˙′ such that P (c˙)∩P (c˙′) 6= ∅ and c˙ 6= c˙′ (the argument here does
not require that c˙ and c˙′ belong to the same C˙i). By (37d), P (c˙)∩P (c˙′)
6= ∅ implies
F˙−1(c˙)∩F˙−1(c˙′) 6= ∅ .(38)
By (8e) and Lemma A.5(b⇒a), we have
F˙−1(c˙)=F˙−1(c˙′) or F˙−1(c˙)∩F˙−1(c˙′)=∅ .
3Symbols with double dots are taken directly from AR. Although this is usually
natural, both F˙ and F¨ appear in this proof (as well as the next proof). F˙ and F¨
are completely unrelated. While F˙ is the feasibility correspondence (9) in an AR∗
form, F¨ (N˙) is a collection of nodes that is defined on AR page 80.
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Thus (38) implies F˙−1(c˙) = F˙−1(c˙′), which implies P (c˙) = P (c˙′) by
(37d) again. Further, (38) also implies the existence of a t˙ such that
{c˙, c˙′} ⊆ F (t˙). Thus c˙ 6= c˙′ implies c˙∩c˙′ = ∅ by (8d).
This and the next four paragraphs show AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii).
Since X¨ = X˙ by (37a), it suffices to consider an arbitrary member of
X˙. Since X˙ ⊆ T˙ by (5), I can denote this arbitrary member by t˙ (the
symbol t˙ is reserved for members of T˙ ). This t˙ is fixed through the
next three paragraphs.
This paragraph argues that {i|F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i 6=∅} is a singleton. Since
t˙∈X˙ by the previous paragraph, and since X˙ is the domain of F˙ by
Lemma A.4, F˙ (t˙) is nonempty. Further, by the definition of F˙ , F˙
assumes values in C˙=∪iC˙i. Thus the last two sentences imply that
{i|F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i 6=∅} has at least one element. Finally, (11b) implies that
the set can have no more than one element.
This paragraph proves (41). Note that
(∀i) A¨i(t˙) = {c˙∈C˙i|t˙∈P (c˙)} = {c˙∈C˙i|t˙∈F˙−1(c˙)}(39)
= {c˙∈C˙i|c˙∈F˙ (t˙)} = F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i ,
where the first equality is the definition of A¨i in AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii)
and the second equality follows from (37d). Thus
J¨(t˙) = {i|A¨i(t˙) 6=∅} = {i|F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i 6=∅} ,(40)
where the first equality is the definition of J¨ in AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii),
and the second equality holds by the previous sentence. Hence the
previous paragraph implies that
J¨(t˙) is a singleton .(41)
Let i∗ be the unique element of J¨(t˙). By (40), F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i∗ 6=∅. Thus
by (11c),
F˙ (t˙) ⊆ C˙i∗ .(42)
Therefore
(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(t˙)(43)
= p˙−1(t˙)
= { t˙∩c˙ | c˙∈F˙ (t˙) }
= { t˙∩c˙ | c˙∈F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i∗ }
= { t˙∩(∩i∈{i∗}c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈{i∗} ∈{i∗}×(F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i∗) }
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= { t˙∩(∩i∈{i∗}c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈{i∗} ∈{i∗}×A¨i∗(t˙) }
= { t˙∩(∩i∈{i∗}c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈{i∗} ∈Πi∈{i∗}A¨i(t˙) }
= { t˙∩(∩i∈J¨(t˙)c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈J¨(t˙) ∈Πi∈J¨(t˙)A¨i(t˙) }
= { t˙∩(∩i∈J¨(t˙)c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈J¨(t˙) ∈ A¨(t˙) } ,
where the first equality holds by (37c), the second equality holds by
(8c), the third follows from (42), the fourth is a rearrangement, the fifth
follows from (39) at i = i∗, the sixth is a rearrangement, the seventh
follows from (41) and the definition of i∗, and the last follows from the
definition of A¨ in AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii).
Equation (43) suffices to prove AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii) under the
presumption that p¨−1(W ) on the left-hand side of (DEF.ii) was not
meant to contain W itself (see the third paragraph of Remark B.6).
Further, the above argument established (41) for any member t˙ of
X¨. This shows the absence of directly specified simultaneous moves
(12). 2
Lemma B.9. Suppose (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is a complete (1c) discrete ex-
tensive form (AR Definition 6 at N=N˙ and (Ci)i=(C˙i)i) without directly
specified simultaneous moves (12). Then the following hold.
(a) (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1).
(b) (W, N˙,∪iC˙i) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8).
(c) (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is an AR
∗ outcome-set form (11).
Proof. (a). By the second line of AR Definition 6, (W, N˙) is a discrete
game tree. This, the assumption of completeness, and Lemma 2.1
together imply that (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree.
(b). This paragraph collects the four identities listed in (44). Let
C˙=∪iC˙i. Derive X¨, F¨ (N˙), p¨, and P¨ from (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) by AR pages
80 and 82. Further, by part (a) and Lemma A.1, we may define T˙ ,
X˙, p˙, and F˙ by (2), (4), (7), and (9). By Lemmas B.3(a), B.3(b), and
B.5(a),
X¨ = X˙ ,(44a)
F¨ (N˙) = T˙ , and(44b)
p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W} = p˙ .(44c)
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Further, the remainder of this paragraph argues that
P¨ |C˙(44d)
= { (c˙, x)∈C˙×X¨ | c˙6⊇x and (∃n˙∈(p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(x)) c˙⊇n˙ }
= { (c˙, x)∈C˙×X˙ | c˙ 6⊇x and (∃n˙∈p˙−1(x)) c˙⊇n˙ }
= { (c˙, t˙)∈C˙×X˙ | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃n˙∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙⊇n˙ }
= F˙−1 .
The first equality follows from Lemma B.7 because [1] (W, N˙) is an AR
discrete game tree by the second line of AR Definition 6, [2] completeness
has been assumed, and [3] C˙ ⊆ P(W ) by the third and fourth lines of
AR Definition 6. The second equality holds by (44a) and (44c). The
third equality holds because X˙ ⊆ T˙ , which follows from (5), which in
turn follows from part (a) (the symbol t˙ is reserved for elements of T˙ ).
The final equality holds by the definition of F˙ and Lemma A.4(a).
I now show the five components of the definition (8) of an AR∗
outcome-set preform. (8a) follows from part (a). (8b) follows from
the third and fourth lines of AR Definition 6.
(8c). Take any t˙ ∈ X˙. By (44a), t˙ ∈ X¨. Note that
(∀i) A¨i(t˙) = {c˙∈C˙i|t˙∈P¨ (c˙)} = {c˙∈C˙i|t˙∈F˙−1(c˙)}(45)
= {c˙∈C˙i|c˙∈F˙ (t˙)} = F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i .
where the first equality is the definition of A¨i from AR Definition 6
(DEF.ii), the second equality holds by (44d), and the last two equalities
are rearrangements. Further,
J¨(t˙) = {i|A¨i(t˙)6=∅} = {i|F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i 6=∅} .(46)
where the first equality is the definition of J¨ from AR Definition 6
(DEF.ii), and the second equality holds by (45).
J¨(t˙) is a singleton by the assumed absence of directly specified si-
multaneous moves (12). Let i∗ be its member. Then by (46),
(∀i 6=i∗) F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i = ∅ .(47)
Further,
F˙ (t˙)∩Ci∗ = (F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i∗)∪
⋃
i 6=i∗(F (t˙)∩C˙i)(48)
= F˙ (t˙)∩⋃iC˙i = F˙ (t˙) ,
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where the first equality holds by the previous sentence, and the last
holds because F˙ is defined to assume values in C˙=∪iC˙i.
Finally, (8c) holds by
p˙−1(t˙) = (p¨|F¨ (N˙)r{W})−1(t˙)(49)
= { t˙∩(∩i∈J¨(t˙)c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈J¨(t˙) ∈ A¨(t˙) }
= { t˙∩(∩i∈J¨(t˙)c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈J(t˙) ∈Πi∈J¨(t˙)A¨i(t˙) }
= { t˙∩(∩i∈{i∗}c˙i) | (c˙i)i∈{i∗} ∈Πi∈{i∗}A¨i(t˙) }
= { t˙∩c˙ | c˙∈A¨i∗(t˙) }
= { t˙∩c˙ | c˙∈F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i∗ }
= { t˙∩c˙ | c˙∈F˙ (t˙) } ,
whose eight equalities are justified as follows. The first equality holds
by (44c). The second equality holds by AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii) un-
der the presumption that p¨−1(W ) on left-hand side of (DEF.ii) was not
meant to contain W itself (see the third paragraph of Remark B.6). The
third equality holds by the definition of A¨ in AR Definition 6 (DEF.ii),
and the fourth by the definition of i∗ above. The fifth is a rearrange-
ment, the sixth holds by (45), and the seventh holds by (48).
(8d). Suppose that t˙, c˙1, and c˙2 were such that {c˙1, c˙2} ⊆ F˙ (t˙) and
c˙1∩c˙2 6= ∅. Then since t˙ belongs to both F˙−1(c˙1) and F˙−1(c˙2), we
have F˙−1(c˙1)∩F˙−1(c˙2) 6= ∅. Thus by (44d), we have P¨ (c˙1)∩P¨ (c˙2) 6=
∅. This and the assumption c˙1∩c˙2 6= ∅ imply c˙1 = c˙2 by AR Definition
6 (DEF.i).
(8e). By Lemma A.5, (8e) is equivalent to
(∀c˙1, c˙2) F˙−1(c˙1)=F˙−1(c˙2) or F˙−1(c˙1)∩F˙−1(c˙2)=∅ .
To prove this, take any c˙1 and c˙2. On the one hand, if c˙1=c˙2, the
first contingency holds. On the other hand, suppose c˙1 6=c˙2. Further
suppose that the second contingency fails: F˙−1(c˙1)∩F˙−1(c˙2)6=∅. By
(44d), P¨ (c˙1)∩P¨ (c˙2)6=∅. Thus by c˙1 6=c˙2 and AR Definition 6 (DEF.i),
P¨ (c˙1)=P¨ (c˙2). Hence by (44d) again, F˙−1(c˙1)=F˙−1(c˙2). Thus the first
contingency holds.
(c). I show the three components of the definition (11) of an AR∗
outcome-set form. (11a) holds by part (b).
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(11b). Consider any c˙ ∈ F˙ (X˙). Then there exists t˙ ∈ X˙ such that
c˙ ∈ F˙ (t˙). Since t˙ ∈ X˙, we may repeat the first two paragraphs in the
above argument for (8c), in order to obtain an i∗ for which (47) holds.
(47) implies (11b).
(11c). Take any i and any t˙ ∈ X˙. Since t˙ ∈ X˙, we may repeat
the first two paragraphs in the above argument for (8c), in order to
obtain an i∗ for which (47) and (48) hold. If i = i∗, then (48) implies
F˙ (t˙) ⊆ C˙i. If i 6= i∗, then (47) implies F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i = ∅. 2
Proof B.10 (for Theorem 1). The theorem follows immediately
from Lemma B.8(b) and Lemma B.9(c). 2
Appendix C. General Results about Conciseness
This appendix proves Theorem 2 (Section 4) as well as all the lem-
mata and propositions in Sections 3 and 4. Like every appendix except
Appendix B, it does not rely on AR.
C.1. For AR∗ preforms
Proof C.1 (for Lemma 3.1). I will argue that (W, N˙, C˙) is not
concise iff C˙ 6=F˙ (X˙) or (∃c˙∈F˙ (X˙)) M(c˙)6=c˙. By the definition (13) of
conciseness, non-conciseness is equivalent to
(∃c˙ /∈F˙ (X˙)) c˙ 6⊆ ∪F˙−1(c˙) or(50a)
(∃c˙∈F˙ (X˙)) c˙ 6⊆ ∪F˙−1(c˙) .(50b)
(50a) is equivalent to the existence of a c˙ /∈F˙ (X˙) because [1] c˙ 6= ∅ for
every c˙ and [2] F˙−1(c˙)=∅ for every c˙ /∈F˙ (X˙) since X˙ is the domain
of F˙ by Lemma A.4. The existence of a c˙ /∈F˙ (X˙) is equivalent to
C˙ 6=F˙ (X˙) because C˙ is always a superset of F˙ (X˙) by the definition of
F˙ . Meanwhile, (50b) is equivalent to (∃c˙∈F˙ (X˙)) c˙∩∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊂ c˙. By
the definition of M, this is equivalent to (∃c˙∈F˙ (X˙)) M(c˙) 6= c˙. 2
Lemma C.2. (a) Suppose (W, N˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1)
with its T˙ (2) and p˙ (7). Further suppose W ⊃ t˙. Then there exists
a unique integer K≥1 such that the sequence (p˙k(t˙))Kk=1 is well-defined
and W = p˙K(t˙).
(b) Suppose (W, N˙, C˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) with its T˙
(2), p˙ (7), and F˙ (9). Further suppose W ⊃ c˙ ⊇ t˙ and define K as
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in part (a). Then there exists an integer L such that K ≥ L ≥ 1 and
c˙ ∈ F˙ (p˙L(t˙)).
Proof. (a). Define X˙ (4). Since t˙∈ T˙r{W}, Lemma A.1, Lemma A.3,
and equation (5) together imply that p˙(t˙) exists and belongs to T˙ .
This paragraph considers any k≥1 and shows that if p˙k(t˙) exists and
belongs to T˙ , then either [1] p˙k(t˙) = W or [2] p˙k+1(t˙) exists and belongs
to T˙ . Accordingly, assume p˙k(t˙) exists and belongs to T˙ . Suppose con-
tingency [1] fails. Then p˙k(t˙) ∈ T˙r{W}, so Lemma A.1, Lemma A.3,
and equation (5) together imply that p˙k+1(t˙) exists and belongs to T˙ .
Thus contingency [2] holds.
By beginning with the last sentence of the first paragraph, and iter-
atively applying the first sentence of the second paragraph, one finds
that either [1] there exists a K≥1 such that (p˙k(t˙))Kk=1 is well-defined
and W = p˙K(t˙), or [2] the infinite sequence (p˙k(t˙))k≥1 is well-defined.
Since each p˙k+1(t˙) ⊃ p˙k(t˙) by the definition of p˙, the second contingency
would imply that { p˙k(t˙) | k≥1 } is an infinite collection of predecessors
of t˙. This contradicts the definition of T˙ . Hence the first contingency
must hold.
It remains to be shown that K is unique. Accordingly suppose there
were K ′ > K such that both p˙K
′
(t˙) and p˙K(t˙) equal W . Then W =
p˙K
′−K(W ). This contradicts p˙K
′−K(W ) ⊃ W which follows from K ′ >
K and the definition of p˙.
(b). By the definition of K and part (a), (p˙k(t˙))Kk=1 is well-defined
and p˙K(t˙) = W . Define p˙0(t˙) = t˙ so that the sequence (p˙k(t˙))Kk=0
becomes well-defined. Note that
c˙ 6⊇ p˙K(t˙) ,(51)
because p˙K(t˙) = W and W ⊃ c˙ by assumption. Also note that
c˙ ⊇ p˙0(t˙)(52)
because p˙0(t˙) = t˙ and c˙ ⊇ t˙ by assumption. Because of (52), we may
let k∗ = max{ k≥0 | c˙⊇p˙k(t˙) }. Further k∗<K because of (51). Hence
c˙ 6⊇ pk∗+1(t˙) and c˙ ⊇ pk∗(t˙) .
Thus c˙ ∈ F˙ (pk∗+1(t˙)) by the definition of F˙ . Set L = k∗+1. 2
Proof C.3. (for Lemma 3.2)
⇒ direction. See the paragraph following the lemma statement.
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⇐ direction. Derive F˙ (9) from (W, N˙, C˙). Suppose W /∈ C˙. Then
take any c˙ and any w ∈ c˙. Note that W ⊃ c˙ ⊇ {w} and that {w} ∈ T˙
because of the finite-horizon assumption. Thus by Lemma C.2(b),
there exists an integer L≥1 such that c˙ ∈ F˙ (p˙L({w})). Equivalently,
p˙L({w}) ∈ F˙−1(c˙). Thus w ∈ p˙L({w}) ⊆ ∪F˙−1(c˙). Since this has been
shown to hold for any c˙ and any w ∈ c˙, (W, N˙, C˙) satisfies the definition
of conciseness. 2
Lemma C.4. Suppose (W, N˙, C˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8)
with its X˙ (4) and F˙ (9). Then the following hold.
(a) F˙ equals the F˙ ′ (9) derived from (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)).
(b) (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform.
Proof. Also derive T˙ (2) and p˙ (7). Note that T˙ , X˙, and p˙ depend
only on the tree (W, N˙).
(a). I argue
F˙ = { (t˙, c˙) | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙]∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙⊇t˙] }
= { (t˙, c˙) | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙]∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙⊇t˙] }|T˙×F˙ (X˙)
= F˙ ′ .
The first equality is the definition of F˙ , and the third equality is the
definition of F˙ ′. To see the second equality, note that [1] X˙ is the
domain of F˙ by Lemma A.4(b), and thus [2] F˙ (X˙) is the range of F˙ .
(b). By assumption, (W, N˙, C˙) satisfies the five components of (8).
This paragraph derives the five components for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)). (8a)
follows from (8a) for (W, N˙, C˙) because (8a) only concerns the tree
(W, N˙). (8b) follow from (8b) for (W, N˙, C˙) because F˙ (X˙) ⊆ C˙. (8c-
e) follow from (8c-e) for (W, N˙, C˙) by part (a). 2
Lemma C.5. Let (W, N˙, C˙) be an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) with
its T˙ (2), X˙ (4), and F˙ (9). Let C˙M := M(F˙ (X˙)). Then
(a) M is a bijection from F˙ (X˙) onto C˙M, and
(b) { (t˙, M(c˙)) | (t˙, c˙)∈F˙ } equals the F˙ M (9) from (W, N˙, C˙M).
Proof. (a). By construction, M is a function from F˙ (X˙) onto M(F˙ (X˙)),
which is C˙M by definition. Thus it remains to be shown that M is in-
jective. Accordingly, suppose that c˙1 and c˙2 are two members of F˙ (X˙)
such that M(c˙1) = M(c˙2). I will show that c˙1 = c˙2.
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I start with two observations. Firstly, since M(c˙1) = M(c˙2), the defi-
nition of M implies
c˙1 ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙1) = c˙2 ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙2) .(53)
Secondly, and independently, since c˙1 and c˙2 are members of F˙ (X˙), we
may take t˙1 and t˙2 such that c˙1 ∈ F˙ (t˙1) and c˙2 ∈ F˙ (t˙2).
This paragraph shows that c˙2 6⊇ t˙1. Suppose hypothetically that
c˙2 ⊇ t˙1. Note that W ⊃ c˙2 since c˙2 6⊇ t˙2 by c˙2 ∈ F˙ (t˙2) and the defini-
tion of F˙ . By the last two sentences, Lemma C.2(b) implies that there
exists an integer L≥1 such that c˙2 ∈ F˙ (p˙L(t˙1)). Note that
∪F˙−1(c˙2) ⊇ p˙L(t˙1) ⊇ t˙1 ,
where the first inclusion holds because F˙−1(c˙2) 3 p˙L(t˙) by the previous
sentence, and the second inclusion holds by the definition of p˙. Thus
c˙1 ⊇ c˙1 ∩∪F˙−1(c˙1) = c˙2 ∩∪F˙−1(c˙2) ⊇ t˙1 ,
where the first inclusion is obvious, the equality is (53), and the second
inclusion follows from [1] the hypothetical assumption that c˙2 ⊇ t˙1 and
[2] the previous sentence. The previous sentence contradicts c˙1 6⊇ t˙1,
which follows from c˙1 ∈ F˙ (t˙1), which follows from the definition of t˙1.
Now define t˙1
]
= t˙1∩c˙1. Since c˙1 ∈ F˙ (t˙1) by the definition of t˙1, (8c)
implies
t˙1
] ∈ p˙−1(t˙1) .(54)
Further,
c˙2 ⊇ c˙2 ∩∪F˙−1(c˙2) = c˙1 ∩∪F˙−1(c˙1) ⊇ c˙1 ∩ t˙1 = t˙1] .(55)
where the first inclusion is obvious, the first equality holds by (53), the
second inclusion holds because F˙−1(c˙1) 3 t˙1 by the definition of t˙1, and
the final equality holds by the definition of t˙1
]
. By the last paragraph,
(54), and (55), we have that c˙2 6⊇ t˙1, t˙1] ∈ p˙−1(t˙1), and c˙2 ⊇ t˙1] . Thus
the definition of F˙ implies c˙2 ∈ F˙ (t˙1).
At this point, we have [1] c˙1 ∈ F˙ (t˙1) by the definition of t˙1, [2]
c˙2 ∈ F˙ (t˙1) by the previous sentence, [3] c˙1 ⊇ t˙1] by the definition of
t˙1
]
, and [4] c˙2 ⊇ t˙1] by (55). Facts [3] and [4] imply that c˙1∩c˙2 is
nonempty. Hence facts [1] and [2] imply that c˙1 = c˙2 by (8d) applied
at t˙1.
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(b). This paragraph shows F˙ M ⊆ { (t˙, M(c˙)) | (t˙, c˙)∈F˙ }. Take any
(t˙, c˙M) ∈ F˙ M. By the definition (9) of F˙ M, there is some t˙] such that
t˙ = p˙(t˙]) ,(56a)
c˙M 6⊇ t˙ , and(56b)
c˙M ⊇ t˙] .(56c)
By the definition of C˙M, there is a c˙ such that (a) c˙ ∈ F˙ (X˙) and (b)
c˙M = M(c˙). By (a) and (15),
W ⊃ c˙ .(57)
By (b) and the definition of M, c˙M = c˙ ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙). By this equality,
(56b) and (56c) imply
c˙ ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙) 6⊇ t˙ and(58)
c˙ ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ t˙] .(59)
(59) trivially implies that
c˙ ⊇ t˙] .(60)
Lemma C.2(b), (57), and (60) together imply the existence of an L≥1
such that c˙ ∈ F˙ (p˙L(t˙])). Hence F˙−1(c˙) 3 p˙L(t˙]). Thus
∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ p˙L(t˙]) ⊇ p˙(t˙]) = t˙ ,
where the first inclusion follows from the last sentence, the second
inclusion follows from the definition of p˙, and the final equality is (56a).
This and (58) imply that c˙ 6⊇ t˙. (56a), (60), and the previous sentence
imply that (t˙, c˙) ∈ F˙ by the definition of F˙ .
Conversely, this paragraph shows F˙ M ⊇ { (t˙, M(c˙)) | (t˙, c˙)∈F˙ }. Take
any (t˙, c˙) ∈ F˙ . By the definition of F˙ , there is some t˙] such that
t˙ = p˙(t˙]) ,(61a)
c˙ 6⊇ t˙ , and(61b)
c˙ ⊇ t˙] .(61c)
(61b) implies that c˙ ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙) 6⊇ t˙. By the definition of M, this is
equivalent to
M(c˙) 6⊇ t˙ .(62)
Further note that
∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ t˙ = p˙(t˙]) ⊇ t˙] ,
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where the first inclusion holds since F˙−1(c˙) 3 t˙ by the definition of t˙,
the equality is (61a), and the last inclusion holds by the definition of
p˙. The previous sentence and (61c) imply that
c˙ ∩ ∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ t˙] .
By the definition of M, this implies M(c˙) ⊇ t˙]. (61a), (62), and the
previous sentence imply that (t˙, M(c˙)) ∈ F˙ M by the definition of F˙ M. 2
Lemma C.6. Let (W, N˙, C˙) be an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) with
its X˙ (4) and F˙ (9). Let C˙M := M(F˙ (X˙)). Then (W, N˙, C˙M) is a concise
(13) outcome-set preform.
Proof. The next five paragraphs will show that (W, N˙, C˙M) is an AR∗
outcome-set preform by deriving the five parts of (8). The final three
paragraphs will show conciseness. Note that the five parts of (8) hold
for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)) because (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform
by Lemma C.4(b).
(8a). This follows from (8a) for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)) simply because (8a)
only concerns the tree (W, N˙).
(8b). Take any c˙M. By the definition of C˙M there exist c˙ and t˙ such
that cM = M(c˙) and c˙ ∈ F˙ (t˙). I argue cM is a subset of W because
c˙M = M(c˙) = c˙∩∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊆ c˙ ⊆ W .
The first equality holds by the definition of c˙ and the second equality
holds by the definition of M. The final inclusion holds by (8b) for
(W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)). Further, I argue cM is nonempty because
c˙M = M(c˙) = c˙∩∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ c˙∩ t˙ 6= ∅ .
The first equality holds by the definition of c˙ and the second equality
holds by the definition of M. The inclusion holds because ∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ t˙
because F˙−1(c˙) 3 t˙ by the definitions of c˙ and t˙. The inequality holds
because c˙∩ t˙ is an immediate successor of t˙ by [1] c˙ ∈ F˙ (t˙) from the
definition of c˙ and t˙ and [2] (8c) for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)).
(8c). I argue that
(∀t˙∈X˙) p˙−1(t˙) = { t˙∩ c˙ | c˙∈ F˙ (t˙) }
= { t˙∩ c˙∩∪F˙−1(c˙) | c˙∈ F˙ (t˙) }
= { t˙∩ M(c˙) | c˙∈ F˙ (t˙) }
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= { t˙∩ M(c˙) | M(c˙)∈ F˙ M(t˙) and c˙∈ F˙ (X˙) }
= { t˙∩ c˙M | c˙M ∈ F˙ M(t˙) } .
The first equality is (8c) for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)). The second holds because,
for any c˙ ∈ F˙ (t˙), we have F˙−1(c˙) 3 t˙ and thus ∪F˙−1(c˙) ⊇ t˙. The third
holds by the definition of M. To see the fourth equality, note [1] the
left-hand predicate is equivalent to the first right-hand predicate by
Lemma C.5(b) and [2] the left-hand predicate implies the second right-
hand predicate since t˙∈ X˙. The fifth equality holds by Lemma C.5(a).
(8d). Consider any t˙ ∈ X˙ and any distinct c˙MA and c˙MB in F˙ M(t˙). By
Lemma C.5(a),
M−1(c˙MA ) 6= M−1(c˙MB ) .(63)
Further, by Lemma C.5(b),
M−1(c˙MA ) ∈ F˙ (t˙) and M−1(c˙MB ) ∈ F˙ (t˙) .(64)
I argue
c˙MA ∩ c˙MB
= M(M−1(c˙MA )) ∩ M(M−1(c˙MB))
= (M−1(c˙MA) ∩ ∪F−1(M−1(c˙MA)) ∩ (M−1(c˙MB) ∩ ∪F−1(M−1(c˙MB))
⊆ M−1(c˙MA) ∩ M−1(c˙MB)
= ∅ .
The first equality follows from Lemma C.5(a). The second follows
from the definition of M. The set inclusion follows from elementary
manipulation. The last equality follows from (63), from (64), and from
(8d) for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)).
(8e). Take any two t˙1 and t˙2. By (8e) for (W, N˙, F˙ (X˙)),
F˙ (t˙1) = F˙ (t˙2) or F˙ (t˙1)∩F˙ (t˙2) = ∅ .
By Lemma C.5(a), this implies (and is in fact equivalent to)
M(F˙ (t˙1)) = M(F˙ (t˙2)) or M(F˙ (t˙1))∩M(F˙ (t˙2)) = ∅ .
By Lemma C.5(b), this implies (and is in fact equivalent to),
F˙ M(t˙1) = F˙ M(t˙2) or F˙ M(t˙1)∩F˙ M(t˙2) = ∅ .
Conciseness. First, I argue
F˙ M(X˙) = M(F˙ (X˙)) = C˙M .(65)
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The first equality holds by Lemma C.5(b). The second equality is the
definition of C˙M.
Second, let MM be the material-part function (14) derived from
(W, N˙, C˙M). I argue
(∀c˙M) MM(c˙M) = c˙M ∩ ∪(F˙ M)−1(c˙M)(66)
= c˙M ∩ ∪F˙−1(M−1(c˙M))
= M(M−1(c˙M)) ∩ ∪F˙−1(M−1(c˙M))
= M−1(c˙M) ∩ ∪F˙−1(M−1(c˙M)) ∩ ∪F˙−1(M−1(c˙M))
= M−1(c˙M) ∩ ∪F˙−1(M−1(c˙M))
= M(M−1(c˙M))
= c˙M ,
The first equality in (66) is the definition of MM. The second equality
holds by Lemma C.5(b), and the third holds by Lemma C.5(a). The
fourth and sixth equalities hold by the definition of M. The last equality
holds by Lemma C.5(a).
By Lemma 3.1, (65) and (66) imply that (W, N˙, C˙M) is concise. 2
Proof C.7 (for Lemma 3.3). Part (a) follows from Lemma C.6.
Parts (b) and (c) follow from Lemma C.5. 2
C.2. For AR∗ forms
Proof C.8 (for Proposition 4.1). By definition (in the sentence be-
fore (19)), the form (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) is concise iff its preform (W, N˙,∪iC˙i)
is concise. Thus it must be shown that (W, N˙,∪iC˙i) is concise iff
W /∈ ∪iCi. This follows immediately from Lemma 3.2 because of the
finite-horizon assumption. 2
Proof C.9 (for Theorem 2). As in the theorem’s first sentence, let
(W, N˙, (C˙i)i) be an AR
∗ outcome-set form (11), with its T˙ (2), X˙ (4),
and F˙ (9). As in the theorem’s second and last sentences, derive M by
(14), let (C˙Mi )i = (M(C˙i∩F˙ (X˙))i, and derive F˙ M (9) from (W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i).
Further, let C˙ = ∪iC˙i and C˙M = ∪iC˙Mi . Note that
C˙M = ∪iC˙Mi(67)
= ∪iM(C˙i∩F˙ (X˙))
= M(∪i[C˙i∩F˙ (X˙)])
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= M((∪iC˙i)∩F˙ (X˙))
= M(C˙∩F˙ (X˙))
= M(F˙ (X˙)) ,
where first equality is the definition of C˙M, the second equality follows
from the definition of (C˙Mi )i, the fifth equality follows from the definition
of C˙, and the last holds because F˙ (X˙) ⊆ C˙ by the definition of F˙ .
This paragraph applies Lemma 3.3. By (11a) and the definition of
C˙, (W, N˙, C˙) is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8), as assumed by the
lemma. The lemma’s definitions of T˙ , X˙, and F˙ coincide with the
definitions in the first sentence of this proof. The lemma’s definition
of C˙M coincides with (67). The lemma’s definition of F˙ M coincides with
the definition in the second sentence of this proof. Hence, the lemma
allows us to conclude that
(W, N˙, C˙M) is a concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform ,(68a)
M is a bijection from F˙ (X˙) onto C˙M , and(68b)
F˙ M = { (t˙, M(c˙)) | (t˙, c˙)∈F˙ } .(68c)
(a). I will show that (W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i) satisfies (19). To begin, (19a) for
(W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i) follows from (68a) and the definition of C˙
M.
To show (19b) for (W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i), I argue that something slightly
stronger holds, namely, that
(∀i, j) C˙Mi ∩C˙Mj = M(C˙i∩F˙ (X˙)) ∩ M(C˙j∩F˙ (X˙))
= M( C˙i∩F˙ (X˙) ∩ C˙j∩F˙ (X˙) )
= M( C˙i∩C˙j∩F˙ (X˙) )
= ∅ .
The first equality follows from the definition of (C˙Mi )i, the second follows
from (68b), and the last follows from (11b) for (W, N˙, (C˙i)i).
Finally, this and the next three paragraphs will show (19c) for
(W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i). Take any i and any t˙∈X˙. By (11c) for (W, N˙, (C˙i)i),
F˙ (t˙)⊆ C˙i or F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i =∅ .(69)
First I argue
F˙ (t˙) ⊆ C˙i(70)
⇒ F˙ (t˙) ⊆ C˙i∩F˙ (X˙)
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⇒ M(F˙ (t˙)) ⊆ M(C˙i∩F˙ (X˙))
⇒ M(F˙ (t˙)) ⊆ C˙Mi
⇒ F˙ M(t˙) ⊆ C˙Mi .
The first implication holds because t˙∈X˙ implies F˙ (t˙)⊆F˙ (X˙). The
second is obvious, the third holds by the definition of C˙Mi , and the
fourth holds by (68c).
Second I argue
F˙ (t˙)∩C˙i = ∅(71)
⇒ F˙ (t˙)∩F˙ (X˙) ∩ C˙i∩F˙ (X˙) = ∅
⇒ M( F˙ (t˙)∩F˙ (X˙) ∩ C˙i∩F˙ (X˙) ) = ∅
⇒ M(F˙ (t˙)∩F˙ (X˙)) ∩ M(C˙i∩F˙ (X˙)) = ∅
⇒ M(F˙ (t˙)∩F˙ (X˙)) ∩ C˙Mi = ∅
⇒ M(F˙ (t˙)) ∩ C˙Mi = ∅
⇒ F˙ M(t˙) ∩ C˙Mi = ∅ .
The first two implications are obvious. The third follows from (68b).
The fourth follows from the definition of C˙Mi . The fifth holds because
t˙∈X˙ implies F˙ (t˙)⊆F˙ (X˙). The last holds by (68c).
To conclude, (69), (70), and (71) together imply
F˙ M(t˙)⊆ C˙Mi or F˙ M(t˙)∩ C˙Mi =∅ ,
which is (19c) for (W, N˙, (C˙Mi )i).
(b–c). These are identical to (68b) and (68c). 2
Proof C.10 (for Proposition 4.2). To put it succinctly, the propo-
sition claims that (19) and (20) are equivalent.
Take any (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) satisfying (19). (19a) is identical to (20a).
(19c) is identical to (20c). Finally, since (W, N˙,∪iC˙i) is concise by
(19a), Lemma 3.1 implies F˙ (X˙) = ∪iC˙i. Hence (19b)’s statement
that C˙i∩C˙j∩F˙ (X˙) = ∅ implies (20b)’s statement that C˙i and C˙j are
disjoint.
Take any (W, N˙, (C˙i)i) satisfying (20). (20a) is identical to (19a).
(20b) implies (19b). (20c) is identical to (19c). 2
Appendix D. Non-concise infinite-horizon examples
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This appendix concerns the examples of Section 3.3. All are AR∗ pre-
forms. The most direct means of analyzing these examples is convo-
luted superficially. To begin, Lemma D.1 in Appendix D.1 establishes
basic results about the Cantor-set tree.
Next, Lemma D.2 in Appendix D.2 concerns Example 3’s family.
Lemma D.3 concerns Example 3 itself. Lemma D.4 concerns Exam-
ple 1, which happens to be a degenerate case within Example 3’s fam-
ily.
Finally, Lemma D.6 in Appendix D.3 concerns Example 2’s family.
It uses Lemma D.4 about Example 1 in its proof. Lemma D.7 concerns
Example 2 itself.
D.1. The Cantor-set tree
Lemma D.1. Let (W 0, N˙0) be the Cantor-set tree that is defined
along with S and D in Section 3.3. Then the following hold.
(a) {D(s)|s} is the T˙ 0 (2) of (W 0, N˙0).
(b) (W 0, N˙0) is an AR∗ outcome-set tree (1).
(c) {D(s)|s} is the X˙0 (4) of (W 0, N˙0).
(d) { (D(s]), D(s)) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} } is the p˙0 (7) of (W 0, N˙0).
Proof. (a). Since N˙0 = {D(s)|s}∪{{w}|w} by definition, it suffices to
show that [1] every D(s) has a finite number of predecessors and [2] every
{w} has an infinite number of predecessors. [1] Take any s. On the one
hand, if s = {}, D(s) = W 0, which has no predecessors. On the other
hand, if s = (si)
m
i=1 has m elements, the collection of its predecessors is
{D({})}∪{D((si)ji=1)|1≤j<m}, which is finite. [2] Take any {w}. Since
w ∈ W 0, it has a infinite base-3 expansion (xi)i≥1 listing 0’s and 2’s.
Thus the collection of {w}’s predecessors is {D((xi)ji=1)|1≤j}, which is
infinite.
(b). Since N˙0 = {D(s)|s}∪{{w}|w} by definition, conditions (1a)
and (1c) follow by inspection, the fact that D({}) = W 0, and the fact
that every D(s) is nonempty.
(1b). Take any n˙1 and n˙2 in N˙0. I consider three cases. [1] Suppose
that either n˙1 or n˙2 equals W 0. Then distinctness implies that exactly
one of the nodes is W 0 and that this node precedes the other. [2]
Suppose that either n1 or n2 is a singleton. Then distinctness and
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nonempty intersection imply that exactly one of the nodes is a singleton
and that this node succeeds the other. [3] Suppose that neither node
is W 0 and that neither node is a singleton. Then there exist nonempty
s1 and s2 such that n˙1 = D(s1) and n˙2 = D(s2). Four subcases arise:
[a] s1 = s2, [b] s1 ⊂ s2, [c] s1 ⊃ s2, or [d] there exists some i, no larger
than the minimum of the lengths of s1 and s2, such that s1i 6= s2i . In
case [a], n1=n2. In case [b], n˙1 ⊃ n˙2. In case [c], n˙1 ⊂ n˙2. In case [d],
n˙1∩n˙2 = ∅.
(1d). Let N˙∗⊆ N˙0 be a nonempty chain. On the one hand, suppose
N˙∗ contains a singleton {w′}. Because N˙∗ is a chain of nonempty sets,
∩N˙∗ = {w′}. Therefore, since N˙0 contains all singletons, ∩N˙∗ ∈ N˙0.
On the other hand, suppose N˙∗ contains no singletons. Then by the
definition of N˙0, we have the existence of a collection S∗ such that N˙∗ =
{D(s)|s∈S∗}. Since N˙∗ is a nonempty chain, and since D(s1)⊇D(s2)
iff s1⊆s2, S∗ is also a nonempty chain. If S∗ is finite, then ∩N˙∗ is
D(∪S∗), where ∪S∗ is the longest element of S∗. If S∗ is infinite, then
∩N˙∗ is the singleton containing the w whose base-3 representation is
(decimal) ∪S∗. Therefore, regardless of whether S∗ is finite or infinite,
∩N˙∗ ∈ N˙0.
(1e). This follows from part (a) and the definition of N˙0.
(c). I argue
X˙0 = N˙0r{{w}|w} = {D(s)|s}∪{{w|w}}r{{w|w}} = {D(s)|s} .
The first equality is the definition of X˙0. The second holds by the
definition of N˙0. The third holds because {D(s)|s}∩{{w}|w} = ∅,
which holds because every D(s) has more than one element.
(d). I argue
p˙0 = { (t˙ ], t˙) | t˙ ] 6=W 0, t˙=min{t˙′|t˙′⊃t˙ ]} }
= { (D(s]), D(s)) | D(s]) 6=W 0, D(s)=min{D(s′)|D(s′)⊇D(s])} }
= { (D(s]), D(s)) | s] 6={}, s=max{s′|s′⊂s]} }
= { (D(s]), D(s)) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} } .
The first equality is the definition of p˙0. The second follows from part
(a). The third and fourth are rearrangements. 2
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D.2. Example 3’s family
Lemma D.2. (Example 3’s family) Let (W 0, N˙0) be the Cantor-set
tree that is defined along with S and D in Section 3.3. Then let E be
a function from {s|s 6={}} such that [1] E(0) = E(2) = ∅ and [2] for
every s with at least two elements, E(s) is a countable subset of D(	s),
where 	s is the sequence that is obtained from s by changing its first
element. Finally, let ΦE denote the triple (W 0, N˙0, {D(s)∪E(s)|s 6={}}).
Then the following hold.
(a) { (D(s), D(s])∪E(s])) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} } is the F˙ E (9) of ΦE.
(b) ΦE is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8).
(c) { (D(s)∪E(s), D(s)) | s 6={} } is the ME (14) of ΦE.
(d) ΦE is concise (13) iff (∀s 6={}) E(s) = ∅.
Proof. Derive T˙ (2), X˙ (4), and p˙0 (7) from (W 0, N˙0).
(a). Take any t˙ and any c˙∈{D(s)∪E(s)|s 6={}}. I argue that
(t˙, c˙) ∈ F˙ E
⇔ (∃t˙ ]) t˙=p˙0(t˙ ]), c˙ 6⊇t˙, and c˙⊇t˙ ]
⇔ (∃t˙ ]) (∃s, s]) t˙=D(s), t˙ ]=D(s]), s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2}, c˙ 6⊇t˙, and c˙⊇t˙ ]
⇔ (∃s, s]) t˙=D(s), s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2}, c˙ 6⊇D(s), and c˙⊇D(s])
⇔ (∃s) t˙=D(s) and either
c˙ 6⊇D(s) and c˙⊇D(s⊕0) or
c˙ 6⊇D(s) and c˙⊇D(s⊕2)
⇔ (∃s, sc) t˙=D(s), c˙=D(sc)∪E(sc), and either
D(sc)∪E(sc)6⊇D(s) and D(sc)∪E(sc)⊇D(s⊕0) or
D(sc)∪E(sc)6⊇D(s) and D(sc)∪E(sc)⊇D(s⊕2)
⇔ (∃s, sc) t˙=D(s), c˙=D(sc)∪E(sc), and either
D(sc) 6⊇D(s) and D(sc)⊇D(s⊕0) or
D(sc) 6⊇D(s) and D(sc)⊇D(s⊕2)
⇔ (∃s, sc) t˙=D(s), c˙=D(sc)∪E(sc), and either
sc 6⊆s and sc⊆s⊕0 or
sc 6⊆s and sc⊆s⊕2
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⇔ (∃s, sc) t˙=D(s), c˙=D(sc)∪E(sc), and either
sc=s⊕0 or
sc=s⊕2 .
The first equivalence is the definition (9) of F˙E, and the second follows
from Lemma D.1(d). The next two are rearrangements. The fifth holds
because c˙ was taken to be an element of {D(s)∪E(s)}. The sixth will be
justified in the following paragraph. The last two are rearrangements.
To justify the sixth equivalence, this paragraph shows that, for any s1
and s2, and for any countable set E⊆W , D(s1)∪E⊇D(s2) iff D(s1)⊇D(s2).
The reverse direction is obvious. To show the contrapositive of the for-
ward direction, suppose that D(s1) 6⊇D(s2). Either [1] there exists an
i (no larger than the minimum of the lengths of s1 and s2) such that
s1i 6=s2i or [2] there does not. In [1], D(s1)∩D(s2) 6=∅. Hence D(s2)rD(s1) is
uncountable because it equals D(s2). In [2], the assumption D(s1)6⊇D(s2)
implies that s1⊃s2, which implies that D(s2)rD(s1) is uncountable. In
either case, the uncountability of D(s2)rD(s1) and the countability of E
imply E 6⊇D(s2)rD(s1). Hence D(s1)∪E 6⊇D(s2).
(b). (8a) holds by Lemma D.1(b). (8b) holds by inspection.
(8c). By Lemma D.1(c), we may let D(s) be an arbitrary element of
X˙0. I argue that
{ D(s)∩c˙ | c˙∈F˙ E(s) }
= { D(s)∩(D(s])∪E(s])) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} }
= { (D(s)∩D(s])) ∪ (D(s)∩E(s])) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} }
= { D(s]) ∪ (D(s)∩E(s])) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} }
= { D(s]) ∪ ∅ | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} }
= (p˙0)−1(D(s)) .
The first equality follows from part (a). The second equality is a re-
arrangement. The third holds because D(s)⊇D(s]). The fourth will be
proved in the following paragraph. The last holds by Lemma D.1(d).
The fourth equality requires two cases. On the one hand, if s={},
then s] is either 0 or 2 and the definition of E states that both E(0) and
E(2) are empty. On the other hand, suppose s 6={}. I argue
D(s)∩E(s]) ⊆ D(s)∩D(	s ]) ⊆ D(s)∩D(	s) = ∅ .
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The first inclusion follows from the definition of E. The second inclusion
follows from D(	s ])⊆D(	s), which follows from s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2}. The
equality holds because s and 	s differ in their first element.
(8d). By Lemma D.1(c), let D(s) be an arbitrary element of X˙0. By
part (a), it only needs to be shown that the two elements of
F˙ E(D(s)) = { D(s⊕0)∪E(s⊕0), D(s⊕2)∪E(s⊕2) }
are disjoint. On the one hand, if s={},
[D({}⊕0)∪E({}⊕0)] ∩ [D({}⊕2)∪E({}⊕2)]
= [D(0)∪E(0)] ∩ [D(2)∪E(2)]
= D(0) ∩ D(2) = ∅ ,
where the second equality follows from the definition of E. On the other
hand, if s 6={},
[D(s⊕0)∪E(s⊕0)] ∩ [D(s⊕2)∪E(s⊕2)]
⊆ [D(s⊕0)∪D(	s⊕0)] ∩ [D(s⊕2)∪D(	s⊕2)]
= ∅ ,
where the set inclusion holds by the definition of E, and where the
equality holds because s⊕0, 	s⊕0, s⊕2, and 	s⊕2 are four distinct
sequences of the same length.
(8e). Part (a) implies that (F˙ E)−1 is single-valued. Thus condition
(a) of Lemma A.5 holds. Hence Lemma A.5(a⇒b) implies (8e).
(c). Take any s 6={}. I argue
ME(D(s)∪E(s))
= [D(s)∪E(s)] ∩ ∪(F˙ E)−1(D(s)∪E(s))
= [D(s)∪E(s)] ∩ D(s−)
= [D(s)∩D(s−)] ∪ [E(s)∩D(s−)]
= D(s) ∪ [E(s)∩D(s−)]
= D(s) ∪ ∅ ,
where s− is the sequence derived from s 6={} by omitting its last com-
ponent. The first equality is the definition of ME. The second follows
from part (a). The third is a rearrangement. The fourth holds because
D(s)⊆D(s−). The fifth must be justified in two cases. First, if s has one
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element, then E(s) = ∅ by the definition of E. Second, if s has more
than one element, I argue
E(s)∩D(s−) ⊆ D(	s)∩D(s−) ⊆ D(	s−)∩D(s−) = ∅ .
The first inclusion follows from the definition of E. The second inclu-
sion holds because [1] 	s− is well-defined because s has more than one
element and [2] D(	s)⊆D(	s−). The equality holds because 	s− and s−
differ in their first element.
(d). I argue
ΦE is concise(72)
⇔ [ F˙ E(X˙0) = {D(s)∪E(s)|s 6={}} and
(∀s 6={}) ME(D(s)∪E(s)) = D(s)∪E(s) ]
⇔ (∀s 6={}) ME(D(s)∪E(s)) = D(s)∪E(s)
⇔ (∀s 6={}) D(s) = D(s)∪E(s)
⇔ (∀s 6={}) E(s) = ∅ .
The first equivalence follows from Lemma 3.1. The second equivalence
holds because
F˙E(X˙0) = F˙E({D(s)|s})
= ∪{ F˙ E(D(s)) | s }
= ∪{ {D(s])∪E(s])|s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2}} | s }
= { D(s])∪E(s]) | s] 6={} } ,
where the first equality follows from Lemma D.1(c), the third equality
follows from this lemma’s part (a), and the other two equalities are
rearrangements. Returning to (72), the third equivalence follows from
this lemma’s part (c). The reverse direction of the fourth equivalence
is obvious. The forward direction holds because
D(s)∩E(s) = ∅ .
Proving this requires two cases. If s has one element, then E(s) = ∅
by the definition of E. If s has more than one element, then D(s)∩E(s)
⊆ D(s)∩D(	s) = ∅ by the definition of E and the fact that s and 	s
differ in their first element. 2
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Corollary D.3. (Example 3) Let (W 0, N˙0) be the Cantor-set tree
that is defined along with S and D in Section 3.3. Let Φ3 denote the
triple
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s/∈{{}, 22}}∪ {D(22)∪{.02}} ) .
(a) The F˙ 3 (9) of Φ3 is
{ (D(s), D(s])) | s 6=2, s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} }
∪ { (D(2), D(20)), (D(2), D(22)∪{.02}) } .
(b) Φ3 is an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8).
(c) .02 is an immaterial outcome in the choice D(22)∪{.02}.
(d) Φ3 is not concise (13).
Proof. Define E by setting E(22) = {.02} and by setting E(s) = ∅ at
every other nonempty s. Since E(22) ⊆ D(02) = D(	2), this E satisfies
the assumption of Lemma D.2. Thus we may apply Lemma D.2 at
ΦE = Φ3. In particular, part (a) follows from Lemma D.2(a). Similarly,
part (b) follows from Lemma D.2(b). Further, part (c) holds because
.02 /∈ D(2) and {D(2)} = (F˙ 3)−1(D(22)∪{.02}) by part (a). Finally, part
(d) follows from part (c) and Lemma 3.1. (Alternatively, parts (c,d)
can be derived from Lemma D.2(c,d).) 2
Corollary D.4. (Example 1) Let (W 0, N˙0) be the Cantor-set tree
that is defined along with S and D in Section 3.3. Let Φ1 denote the
triple
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s/∈{}}) .
(a) The F˙ 1 (9) of Φ1 is { (D(s), D(s])) | s]∈{s⊕0, s⊕2} }.
(b) Φ1 is a concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform (8).
Proof. Define E by setting E(s) = ∅ at every nonempty s. Since this
E satisfies the assumption of Lemma D.2, we may apply Lemma D.2 at
ΦE = Φ1. In particular, part (a) follows from Lemma D.2(a). Further,
part (b) follows from Lemma D.2(b,d). 2
D.3. Example 2’s family
Lemma D.5 does not assume the Cantor-set tree used elsewhere in
this Appendix D. Its argument is easier to see at an abstract level.
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Lemma D.5. Let (W, N˙, C˙) be an AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) with
its T˙ (2) and F˙ (9). Further let
A+ = { W⊇a⊃∅ | (/∃t˙) a⊇t˙ }
and let C˙+ be a nonempty subcollection of A+. Then the following hold.
(a) F˙ is also derived (9) from (W, N˙, C˙∪C˙+).
(b) (W, N˙, C˙∪C˙+) is a non-concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform (8)
in which all the members of C+ are nowhere-feasible.
Proof. Derive p˙ (7) from (W, N˙). Derive F˙+ (9) from (W, N˙, C˙∪C˙+).
Before proceeding with parts (a) and (b), I argue
(∀c˙+∈C˙+) (F˙+)−1(c˙+) =(73)
{ t˙ | c˙+ 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙ ]∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙+⊇t˙ ] } = ∅ .
Accordingly, take any c˙+∈C˙+. The first equality follows from the def-
inition of F˙+. The second equality follows from (/∃t˙ ]) c˙+⊇t˙ ], which
follows from C˙+⊆A+ and the definition of A+.
(a). Note that
(∀c˙∈C˙) (F˙+)−1(c˙) = { t˙ | c˙ 6⊇t˙ and (∃t˙ ]∈p˙−1(t˙)) c˙⊇t˙ ] } = F˙−1(c˙) ,
where the first equality follows from the definition of F˙+ and the second
equality follows from the definition of F˙ . Also note that
(∀c˙+∈C˙+rC˙) (F˙+)−1(c˙+) = ∅ = F˙−1(c˙+) ,
where the first equality follows from (73) and the second equality fol-
lows from the fact that F˙ is a subset of T˙×C˙. These two observations
together imply that (∀c˙′∈C˙∪C˙+) (F˙+)−1(c˙′) = F˙−1(c˙′). Thus F˙+ = F˙ .
(b). By assumption, (W, N˙, C˙) satisfies the five components of the
definition (8) of a preform. This paragraph derives the five components
for (W, N˙, C˙∪C˙+). (8a) follows from (8a) for (W, N˙, C˙) because (8a)
only concerns the tree (W, N˙). (8b) holds because [1] C˙ is a collection
of nonempty subsets by (8b) for (W, N˙, C˙) and [2] C˙+ is a collection of
nonempty subsets of W by C˙+ ⊆ A+ and the definition of A+. (8c-e)
follow from (8c-e) for (W, N˙, C˙) because of part (a).
(73) implies that every element of C˙+ is nowhere-feasible. Thus,
since C˙+ 6= ∅ by assumption, (W, N˙, C˙∪C˙+) has at least one nowhere-
feasible choice. Hence, the preform is not concise by Lemma 3.1. 2
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Lemma D.6. (Example 2’s family) Let (W 0, N˙0) be the Cantor-set
tree that is defined along with S and D in Section 3.3. Next let C˙+ be a
nonempty collection of nonempty countable subsets of W 0. Then
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s 6={}}∪C˙+ )
is a non-concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) in which all the
elements of C˙+ are nowhere-feasible choices.
Proof. Define A+ as in Lemma D.5. This paragraph shows that C˙+
(as defined in this lemma’s statement) is a nonempty subcollection of
the A+. C˙+ is nonempty by definition. Further, Lemma D.1(a) implies
A+ = { W 0⊇a⊃∅ | (/∃s) a⊇D(s) } .(74)
Now take any c˙+∈C˙+. By (74), it suffices to show that [1] c˙+ is a
nonempty subset of W 0 and that [2] (/∃s) c˙+⊇D(s). The former holds
by the definition of C˙+. The latter holds because c˙+ is countable by
the definition of C˙+ and because every D(s) is uncountable.
I now apply Lemma D.5 to (W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s}).4 (W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s}) is
a preform by Lemma D.4(b). This and the previous paragraph establish
Lemma D.5’s assumptions. Thus Lemma D.5(b) implies this lemma’s
conclusion. 2
Corollary D.7. (Example 2) Let (W 0, N˙0) be the Cantor-set tree
that is defined along with S and D in Section 3.3. Then
(W 0, N˙0, {D(s)|s 6={}}∪{{1}})
is a non-concise (13) AR∗ outcome-set preform (8) in which {1} is a
nowhere-feasible choice.
Proof. Apply Lemma D.6 at C˙+ = {{1}}. 2
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